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Abstract 
 
Background: Cognitive defusion is a core therapeutic process in Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT). ACT helps clients distance themselves from cognitive 
content that functions as a barrier to pursuing valued behavioural directions. This 
systematic review focuses on cognitive defusion techniques that use deliteralisation to try 
to reduce the literal quality of thoughts and help individuals see them as just thoughts 
rather than absolute truths.  
Aims: To synthesise experimental findings regarding the effects of cognitive defusion on 
distress and believability in experimental laboratory-based component studies. 
Method: A systematic literature search was conducted in June 2013 using CINAHL, 
EMBASE, MEDLINE, PsychINFO, Web of Science, and the Cochrane Library databases 
to identify relevant studies. 
Results: Nine studies met inclusion criteria for review. The majority of studies (i.e. 7) 
were rated ―moderate‖ in quality, the remaining two were rated ―good‖ and ―low‖. 
Cognitive defusion was generally shown to produce superior results to distraction, 
imaginal exposure, and control conditions, and similar results to cognitive restructuring 
and thought suppression. The studies reviewed also reported findings about potential 
moderator variables, namely the use of experiential exercises and the duration of cognitive 
defusion techniques. 
Conclusions: Given the promising findings in relation to cognitive defusion and the dearth 
of research in this area, it would seem that further research into this therapeutic technique 
is warranted. 
 
 
Keywords:  Cognitive defusion; Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; Deliteralisation  
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1. Introduction 
 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is a third-wave cognitive behavioural 
therapy. Its main aim is to increase psychological flexibility. This is the ability to contact 
the present moment more fully as a conscious human being, and to change or continue with 
behaviour that serves valued life goals. Six core ACT processes establish psychological 
flexibility. They are called acceptance, cognitive defusion, contact with the present 
moment, self as context, values, and committed action. Acceptance or willingness means 
opening up and making room for painful feelings and sensations. Instead of struggling with 
them, we let them be. Contact with the present moment means consciously paying 
attention to the here-and-now instead of drifting off into our thoughts or operating on 
automatic pilot. Self-as-context involves developing a sense of self as observer that is 
stable and independent of the changing experiences of each moment. The values process is 
defining what is most important in our life. Committed action means taking effective 
action, guided by our values (Harris, 2009). 
 
This only leaves cognitive defusion, which is the focus of the systematic review. ACT 
states that the modification of problematic psychological content (e.g. thoughts) in 
function, and not in form or frequency, is the aim of treatment (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999). From an ACT perspective, clients are frequently fused with painful or negatively 
evaluated psychological content and defusion strategies aim to create a defused perspective 
that allows greater behavioural flexibility. Fusion means getting caught up in our thoughts 
and allowing them to dominate our behaviour. Defusion means separating or distancing 
from our thoughts, letting them come and go instead of getting caught up in them. The aim 
of cognitive defusion is to see the true nature of thoughts and mental images as nothing 
more or less than words or pictures and to respond to them in terms of workability rather 
than literality (i.e. how helpful they are rather than how true they are) (Harris, 2009). ACT 
helps clients in defusing from cognitive content that functions as a barrier to pursuing 
valued behavioural directions (Flaxman, Blackledge, & Bond, 2011). The primary question 
the client should be asking is whether ―buying‖ a thought would move the client towards a 
life in line with his or her chosen values or whether it moves the client in some other 
direction (Luoma & Hayes, 2008). 
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There are currently well over a hundred cognitive defusion techniques documented in ACT 
books, and many more that have not been written up (Harris, 2009). The strategy with the 
most empirical support is Titchener‘s repetition technique, a vocalising technique, which 
involves saying a word aloud over and over again with increasing rapidity for a period of 
about 20-30 seconds (Hinton & Gaynor, 2010). Titchener (1916) argued that when a word 
was said aloud over and over again, the context for words to have literal meaning was 
removed. Within ACT, clients might be encouraged to repeat negative words rapidly (e.g. 
―stupid, stupid, stupid…‖). Clients have reported that towards the end of the exercise, they 
experienced the words simply as a strange sound (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). The 
therapist then uses this experience to highlight that the client‘s negative thought content is 
purely verbal and not a reflection of reality.  
 
Although cognitive defusion strategies are frequently used within an ACT-based clinical 
context, the empirical evidence to support their efficacy is relatively limited (Healy et al. 
2008). Studies examining the impact of a particular psychotherapy technique in isolation 
are quite rare but there are some experimental analogue studies of defusion (Luoma & 
Hayes, 2008). 
 
As mentioned above, there are many different types of cognitive defusion techniques. This 
systematic review focuses on deliteralisation techniques that try to reduce the literal quality 
of thoughts and help individuals see them as just thoughts rather than absolute truths. It 
excludes metaphorical and meditative-type techniques (e.g. ―Leaves on a Stream‖) about 
letting thoughts come and go or taking a non-judgmental stance in relation to thoughts, as 
these techniques overlap with the other core ACT processes of acceptance and contact with 
the present moment. Furthermore, in recent years, a number of related concepts and 
procedures have emerged that have similar goals to cognitive defusion, such as 
metacognitive strategies (Luoma & Hayes, 2008). This review will, however, focus on the 
use of cognitive defusion within an ACT context. 
 
Three previous reviews were identified that examined component parts of ACT 
interventions (Hayes Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006; Ruiz, 2010; Levin, 
Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012). The most recent of these (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, 
& Hayes, 2012) was a meta-analysis of 66 laboratory-based component studies evaluating 
treatment elements and processes suggested by the psychological flexibility model 
underlying ACT (i.e. defusion, acceptance, self as context, committed action, values, and 
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present moment). The authors only included studies testing single-session conditions 
targeting psychological flexibility components as compared to alternative conditions (e.g. 
distraction, attention control condition), to which participants were randomly assigned. 
They identified five cognitive defusion studies, all of which used the vocalisation 
technique of verbal repetition (De Young Lavender, Washington, Looby, & Anderson, 
2010; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig 2004; Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan, 
2010; Masuda et al., 2010; Watson, Burley & Purdon, 2010). They compared cognitive 
defusion to inactive comparison conditions and calculated a medium effect size (Hedge‘s g 
= .74), favouring cognitive defusion.  
 
Mediational analysis provides one way of obtaining support for the components of 
theoretical models by examining whether changes in the outcomes of interventions are 
functionally related to changes in theoretical processes. An additional method for testing 
theoretical components is to evaluate the impact of theoretically-derived treatment 
components in laboratory-based experimental research. Such laboratory-based component 
studies provide a methodology, in which intervention and contextual factors can be 
carefully controlled and manipulated to test hypotheses in a way that would be difficult to 
achieve in treatment outcome research. For this reason, it was decided to conduct a review 
of experimental laboratory-based component studies of cognitive defusion.  
 
The current systematic review focuses on the effects of deliteralisation-type cognitive 
defusion techniques on the two outcome variables of distress and believability. It was 
decided to focus on these two variables as an initial search of the literature revealed these 
to be the two most commonly measured outcomes. This is not surprising given their direct 
relevance to cognitive defusion.  
 
 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Search Methodology 
A systematic literature search was conducted in June 2013 to identify relevant articles from 
the following electronic databases: Medline, Embase, Psychinfo, CINAHL, Web of 
Science, and the Cochrane library. Subject heading and keyword searches used the 
following terms: 
Defusion OR Deliterali* 
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Truncating was used for the term ―deliteralisation‖ to ensure identification of relevant 
terms, where word endings may differ (e.g. plural, adjectives, spelling). Deliteralisation 
was included as a search term because cognitive defusion was initially called 
deliteralisation by Hayes & Strosahl (2004). Dr Steven Hayes, a founding member of ACT, 
was also contacted to enquire about any further relevant articles. Finally, the reference lists 
of articles included in the systematic review and the reviews mentioned above were hand-
searched to identify other potentially relevant studies. 
 
 
2.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria  
Inclusion Criteria 
 Experimental laboratory-based component studies examining the effects of 
deliteralisation-type cognitive defusion techniques on distress and believability of 
negative psychological content 
 Studies reported in English 
 Studies in peer-reviewed publications 
Exclusion criteria 
 Dissertations 
 Papers reporting expert opinion 
 Observational studies 
 Studies including metaphorical and meditative-type techniques about letting 
thoughts come and go or taking a non-judgmental stance towards thoughts  
 Mediational analyses of ACT interventions 
 Studies that included cognitive defusion as a component of a larger ACT 
intervention 
 Studies that did not include distress or believability as a dependent variable 
 
2.3 Quality criteria 
Included studies were evaluated using a structured assessment tool of methodological 
quality (see Appendix 1.2). The tool was developed based on a variety of sources, namely: 
 Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN) methodology checklist 2 for 
Controlled Trials (2012)  
 Boutron et al.‘s (2005) checklist for assessing the quality of Randomised 
Controlled Trials evaluating non-pharmacological treatments 
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 Clinical Trials Assessment Measure (CTAM; Tarrier & Wykes, 2004)  
 Downs and Black Checklist (1998) - a checklist for the assessment of the 
methodological quality both of randomised and non-randomised studies of 
healthcare interventions 
The reviewer decided to combine questions from these tools in order to achieve a 
comprehensive mix of methodology quality questions that were deemed to be relevant to 
the studies reviewed.  
 
Methodological quality was assessed by the author and an independent rater trained in the 
evaluation of clinical research. Each rater assessed the quality of papers using a score of 
zero to three for each item of the scale.  
 
2.4 Guidelines for conducting and reporting the systematic review 
The reviewer was guided by the SIGN Methodology Checklist 1 for Systematic Reviews 
and Meta-analyses (2012). In addition, the PRISMA statement (Liberati et al., 2009) for 
reporting systematic reviews and meta-analyses of studies that evaluate health care 
interventions informed the reporting of this systematic review.  
 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Search Results 
A total of nine studies fulfilled criteria for inclusion in the review. The study selection 
process is illustrated below (Figure 1). It should be noted that the cognitive defusion 
instructions for one of the studies included in the review (i.e. Pilecki & McKay, 2012) 
made reference to another core therapeutic process of ACT, namely self as context.  
However, it was decided to retain this study in the review, as the reference to self as 
context appeared to have been added to enhance defusion and no metaphors or experiential 
exercises specific to self as context were included in the instructions. 
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*It should be noted these studies included 14 analyses in total, as some of the papers included (i) more 
than one study, (ii) analyses of combined data from a number of studies, (iii) or analyses of subsamples.  
 
Fig. 1: Flow diagram of study selection process  
Databases searched:  
MEDLINE (n=39); EMBASE 
(n=63); PschINFO (n=117); Cinahl 
(n=16); Web of Science (n=47); the 
Cochrane library (n=9) 
Total=291, Duplicates removed=130 
n=161 
 
Hand search of included 
articles and review 
articles 
n=0 
Expert in the 
field 
n=0 
Total of Studies identified 
 n=161 
Total Exclusions 
 n=152 
Foreign language (n=3) 
Dissertations (n=5) 
Alternative use of terms defusion/deliteralisation, (eg. in psycholanalysis) 
(n=71) 
Non-empirical articles (e.g. expert opinion) (n=36) 
Interventions including defusion as a component part, mediational analyses, 
observational studies (n=36) 
No measure of distress or believability included (n=2) 
 
Included Studies 
n=9* 
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3.2 Characteristics of Included Studies 
3.2.1 Samples 
The study samples are described in Table 1. Participants were all student volunteers. Their 
mean age was either late teenage years or early twenties. Females made up at least 60% of 
the sample in every study, with two of the studies consisting of only females. All of the 
studies were conducted in the United States of America or Canada, except for one Irish 
study (Healy et al., 2008). Two of the nine included studies consisted of clinical analogue 
samples (Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011; Watson, Burley & Purdon, 
2010). The remaining seven were non-clinical samples. However, two of these studies 
(Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell & Sheehan, 2010; Masuda et al., 2010) included sub-analyses 
of participants, who met a cut-off score of 10 on the Beck Depression Inventory-II. They 
were described as having ―elevated depressive symptoms‖. Less than a third (i.e. 29%) of 
the analyses included a power calculation or had a sample size greater than 27 in each 
treatment group, one of the quality criteria in the CTAM (Tarrier & Wykes, 2004). 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
Author Country Recruitment Sample size 
(N ) 
 Average Age of 
Total Sample   
Sex Distribution of 
Total Sample F:M  
 
Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, Wolitzky-
Taylor (2011) 
US 
Clinical analogue sample of individuals with highly distressing 
thoughts regarding body shape. Psychology students completed 
Body Shape Questionnaire for course credit. If they scored > than 
the mean for a sample of women with eating disorders, they were 
invited to participate.  
26 
Mean=19.4 
(SD=2.1) 
 
 
 
     26:0  
De Young, Lavender, Washington, 
Looby, & Anderson (2010) 
US 
Non-clinical undergraduate students participated for credit toward a 
course requirement 
200 
Mean=19.3 
(SD=3.6) 
136:64  
Healy et al. (2008) Ireland 
Undergraduate student volunteers recruited through faculty 
announcements in a psychology department 
60 
Mode=21 
(Range=18-57) 
31:29  
Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig 
(2004) 
US 
Undergraduate students recruited from psychology course subject 
pool 
8 (Range =18-19) 8:0  
Masuda et al. (2009) 
Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 2 
US 
 
 
US 
Recruited from an undergraduate psychology  
students‘ subject pool 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
94 
Mean=20.8 
 
 
Mean=20.2 
55:20 
 
 
67:27 
 
Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & 
Sheehan (2010) 
US 
Non-clinical undergraduate psychology students recruited from 
web-based research participant pool (included subgroup with 
elevated depressive symptoms) 
147 
Mean=20.52 
(SD=4.39) 
115:32 
 
 
Masuda et al. (2010) US 
Non-clinical psychology undergraduates 
recruited from web-based research participant pool (included 
subgroup with elevated depressive symptoms) 
132 
Mean=20.91 
(SD=6.96) 
102:30  
Pilecki & McKay (2012) US 
Undergraduate students recruited from a University subject pool 
 
67 
Mean=19.29 
(SD=1.02) 
40:27  
Watson, Burley, & Purdon (2010)  
Study 1 
 
 
Study 2 
 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
Canada 
Psychology students high in contamination fears, score on 
contamination subscale of  Padua Inventory-WSUR ≥ mean 
subscale score (14) of a clinical sample diagnosed with OCD 
 
93 
 
 
134 
 
Mean=19.39 
(SD=1.79) 
 
Mean=19.33           
(SD=1.80) 
82:11 
 
 
88:46 
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3.2.2 Study design 
As can be seen from Table 2 below, participants in two of the studies (Deacon, Fawzy, 
Lickel & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011; Watson, Burley & Purdon, 2010) were instructed to 
practise the intervention, to which they were assigned, in their natural environment over a 
week. All of the studies used randomisation when assigning participants to groups. 
However, the process of randomisation was not explained in any of these studies. The 
majority of the nine studies (i.e. 7) employed verbal repetition as a cognitive defusion 
technique, whereas the remaining studies used the technique of noticing and labelling 
thoughts. Eight of the studies compared cognitive defusion to either a control condition or 
an active alternative treatment strategy. Masuda et al. (2009) compared various durations 
of verbal repetition and did not include any alternative treatment or control condition. 
Cognitive defusion was compared to the following active treatment strategies: cognitive 
restructuring (Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011); distraction (Masuda, 
Feinstein, Wendell & Sheehan, 2010; Masuda et al., 2010); thought suppression (Pilecki & 
McKay, 2012); imaginal exposure (Watson, Burley & Purdon, 2010); and an Implicit 
Associations Task (DeYoung, Lavender, Washington, Looby & Anderson, 2010). All of 
the studies used idiosyncratic self-report measures of distress and believability. The 
majority of these measures were one-item, except for one study (Watson, Burley & 
Purdon, 2010). One study also employed the Stroop test as an indirect measure of 
emotional arousal (Pilecki & McKay, 2012).  
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Table 2: Study Design Characteristics in relation to Distress and Believability 
 
Author Setting Design/ 
Randomisation   
Cognitive Defusion Technique 
(CD) 
Rationale/Instructions 
Comparison/Control condition  Dependent variables  
Deacon, 
Fawzy, 
Lickel, & 
Wolitzky-
Taylor (2011) 
 
 
 
Laboratory 
+ 
Natural 
Participants randomly 
assigned to 1 of 2 
conditions 
Verbal repetition (CD) (60 
seconds) of negative body 
image thoughts reduced to a 
single word (e.g. fat). 
Rationale plus experiential 
exercise in laboratory and 
practice over the following 
week.  
Cognitive restructuring (CR) of 
negative body image thoughts. 
Rationale plus experiential exercise in 
laboratory and practice over the 
following week.  
No control condition. 
Ratings of thought of being fat conducted 
pre-rationale, post-rationale, and post-
homework (a week later). Self-report 1-item 
measures of distress and accuracy 
 
De Young, 
Lavender, 
Washington, 
Looby, & 
Anderson 
(2010) 
Laboratory Participants were 
randomised to 1 of 5 
conditions  
Verbal repetition (30 
seconds) of negative self-
referential words with (CD-
R) or without a rationale 
(CD)   
Implicit Associations Task with (IAT-
R) or without rationale (IAT) and a 
Control Condition (C) (reading about 
hydrogen fuel cell technology) 
 
Self-report 1-item measures of discomfort 
and believability 
 
Healy et al. 
(2008) 
Laboratory Participants 
randomised to 1 of 3 
groups (Pro-CD, i.e. 
told CD decreases 
emotional impact of 
negative self-
statements; Anti-CD, 
i.e. told CD increases 
emotional impact;  
Neutral instructions, 
i.e. told CD has no 
impact on emotional 
reaction) 
 
Labelling thoughts (CD). 
(Described in next column) 
All participants presented with 10 
negative and 10 positive self-
statements in normal (e.g. I am a bad 
person), CD (e.g. I am having the 
thought that I am a bad person), and 
abnormal formats (e.g. I have a 
wooden chair and I am a bad person)  
(Results are not presented for positive 
statements as they are not the focus of 
this review) 
 
Self-report 1-item measures of discomfort 
and believability 
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Masuda, 
Hayes, 
Sackett, & 
Twohig 
(2004) 
 
 
 
Laboratory Experiment 1:  
4 participants 
exposed to CD and 
distraction  
 
Experiment 2: 
Another 4 
participants exposed 
to CD and thought 
control 
 
Clinical rationale and verbal 
repetition (30 seconds) of 
negative self-relevant 
thoughts restated in one word 
Experiment 1: Control condition-
Distraction/no clinical rationale (i.e. 
reading about Japan).  
 
 
Experiment 2: Thought control 
tasks/rationale provided (e.g. positive 
self-talk, positive imagery, and 
breathing training). This was a control 
condition intended to control for 
demand characteristics. 
 
Self–report 1-item measures of discomfort 
and believability (taken pre- and post-
intervention) 
 
Masuda et al. 
(2009) 
Exp. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exp. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results of 
exp. 1 + 2 
combined 
Laboratory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laboratory 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants randomly 
assigned to 1 of  3 
conditions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants randomly 
assigned to1 of 3 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Violates 
randomisation 
Verbal repetition of negative 
self-relevant thought restated 
in one word. 3 conditions: 1. 
Rationale and training (with 
neutral word, i.e. milk) 2. 
Rationale, training, and 3-
second repetition. 3. 
Rationale, training, and 20-
second repetition.  
 
Verbal repetition of negative 
self-relevant thought restated 
in one word. 3 conditions – 
1. Rationale, training, and 1-
second repetition of word. 2. 
Rationale, training, and 10-
second repetition. 3. 
Rationale, training, and 30-
second repetition of word.   
                      
Conditions from previous 2 
experiments were combined 
and data were  reanalysed  
No active comparison condition/No 
control condition  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No active comparison condition/No 
control condition 
Self-report ratings of discomfort and 
believability 
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Masuda, 
Feinstein, 
Wendell, & 
Sheehan 
(2010) 
Laboratory Participants randomly 
assigned to 1 of 5 
conditions 
Verbal repetition. 2 
conditions - rationale and 
training (verbal repetition of 
neutral word for 20 seconds) 
(Partial) (P-CD) or rationale, 
training with neutral word, 
and experiential exercise (30 
seconds) with negative self-
referential word (Full) (F-
CD) 
Thought distraction (active 
comparison), 2 conditions - rationale 
and training with neutral word (Partial) 
or rationale, training with neutral 
word, and experiential exercise with 
negative self-referential word (Full) 
Or distraction-based experimental 
control condition (e.g. reading about 
Stonehenge) to control for non-specific 
factors. No rationale, training, or 
experiential exercise. 
 
Self-report 1-item measures of discomfort 
and believability (used pre- and post-
intervention) 
 
Masuda et al. 
(2010)  
Laboratory Participants randomly 
assigned to 1 of 3 
conditions 
30-second verbal repetition 
of negative self-referential 
thoughts restated in one word 
(rationale provided) 
Thought distraction strategy (active 
condition)-asked to think of something 
emotionally neutral or less unpleasant 
(rationale provided). Distraction-based 
experimental control task (inactive 
control condition) - no rationale, 
reading an emotionally neutral article 
about Japan.  
 
Self-report 1-item measures of discomfort 
and believability (pre- and post-intervention) 
 
Pilecki & 
McKay 
(2012) 
Laboratory Randomly assigned to 
1 of  3 conditions 
Noticing and labelling 
thoughts as thoughts 
(rationale and practice 
session)  
Thought suppression (rationale and 
practice session) and control condition- 
asked to employ a strategy of their 
choosing for managing unwanted 
thoughts (e.g. think of other things) 
(also included a practice session) 
 VAS ratings of emotional response to 3 
video clips chosen to elicit fear, sadness, and 
disgust, i.e. asked to rate the degree to which 
clip caused participants to feel the following 
6 emotions (sad, angry, amused, disgusted, 
fearful/anxious, content). Plus performance 
on a Stroop test following presentation of 
video clips (indirect measure of emotional 
arousal) 
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Watson, 
Burley, & 
Purdon 
(2010) 
Study1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laboratory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laboratory 
+ 
Natural 
Participants were 
randomised to 1 of 3 
conditions. All 
participants 
completed a category 
membership decision 
task (CMDT) prior to 
interventions to test 
for semantic satiation 
in the CD condition 
(did not produce 
significant changes in 
negative response 
indexª)  
 
Similar to study 1, 
except that 
participants asked to 
practice intervention 
strategy each day 
over one-week 
follow-up period 
Verbal repetition (30 
seconds) of contamination-
related words following 
rationale 
Brief (30 seconds) imaginal exposure 
(IE) to contamination-related thoughts 
(plus rationale) and a control condition 
(sitting quietly, no rationale) 
Self-report negative response indexª= 
average of distress, believability, and 
meaningfulness ratings. Baseline ratings 
(before CMDT), pre-intervention, post-
intervention, and follow-up (one week later) 
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3.3 Study Quality Results 
Inter-rater reliability regarding study quality was assessed by calculating the frequency of 
agreements between raters for each score category (0-3) across all items and all studies. 
The agreement rate was 76%. Total agreement for all items was subsequently achieved 
through discussion between raters. A percentage quality rating was then calculated for each 
study (see Appendix 1.3). The following rule of thumb was applied to describe the quality 
of the studies: Good (> 75%); Moderate (50-75%); Poor (<50%). Table 3 provides details 
of these results.   
 
Table 3: Methodological Quality Ratings of Included Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author 
 
Rating 
(0-100%) 
Quality 
Category 
Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor (2011) 
 
52 
 
 
Moderate 
 
De Young et al. (2010) 57  
 
Moderate 
Healy et al. (2008) 52 
 
Moderate 
Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig (2004) 30 
 
Low 
Masuda et al. (2009) Exp. 1 
 
50 
 
Moderate 
                                  Exp. 2 
 
50 
 
Moderate 
                                  Exps 1 +2 
 
50 
 
Moderate 
Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan (2010) 
 
 
64 
61 
 
Moderate 
Subgroup 
 
Masusde 
Mas 
61 Moderate 
Masuda et al. (2010) 
 
 
76 Good 
Subgroup 
 
 
67 Moderate 
Pilecki & McKay (2012) 64 Moderate 
Watson, Burley, & Purdon (2010) Study 1 52 Moderate 
                                                       Study 2 60 Moderate  
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3.4 Impact of Cognitive Defusion on Distress and Believability 
The results of studies comparing cognitive defusion to alternative treatment conditions, to 
control conditions and finally the studies that did not include a comparison condition are 
described below. In addition, effect sizes for the studies are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Effect Sizes 
Author Effectiveness of Cognitive Defusion (CD) 
 
 
Deacon, Fawzy, 
Lickel, & 
Wolitzky-Taylor 
(2011) 
 
 
 
 
Within CD group   
Fat distress:    Rationale phase, d=0.87; Homework phase, d=-0.04 
Fat accuracy:  Rationale phase, d=1.20; Homework phase, d=-0.14 
(Positive values indicate change in the direction of improvement) 
Between groups  
Fat distress:    Rationale phase, d=0.32; Homework phase, d=-0.52 
Fat accuracy: Rationale phase, d=0.75; Homework phase, d=-0.94  
(Positive values indicate greater improvement in CD condition, negative values 
indicate greater improvement in CR condition)  
De Young, 
Lavender, 
Washington, 
Looby, & 
Anderson (2010) 
 
Within-group (pre-post) 
CD-R: lower discomfort d=0.61;  lower believability d=0.95 
CD:     lower discomfort d=0.57;  lower believability d=0.67 
Between group using post-test results* 
CD-R vs. CD:       discomfort d=0.08; believability d=-0.20 
CD-R vs. IAT-R:  discomfort d=0.01; believability d=-0.40 
CD-R vs. IAT:      discomfort d=-0.06; believability d=-0.30 
CD-R vs. Control: discomfort d=-0.16; believability d=-0.24 
(Positive values indicate higher discomfort and believability in CD-R condition) 
CD vs. IAT-R:  discomfort d=-0.08; believability d=-0.15 
CD vs. IAT:      discomfort d=-0.15; believability d=-0.10 
CD vs. Control: discomfort d=-0.25; believability d=-0.04 
(Positive values indicate higher discomfort and believability in CD condition) 
 
Healy et al. (2008) 
 
Within groups-Comfort ratings* 
Pro-CD instructions 
CD vs. Normal: d=-0.41; CD vs. Abnormal: d=-0.27 
Anti-CD instructions 
CD vs. Normal; d=-0.23; CD vs. Abnormal: d=-0.10 
Neutral instructions 
CD vs. Normal: d=-0.27; CD vs. Abnormal: d=-0.34 
Within groups-Believability ratings* 
Pro-CD instructions 
CD vs. Normal : d=-1.34; CD vs. Abnormal : d=-1.17 
Anti-CD instructions 
CD vs. Normal : d=-0.31; CD vs. Abnormal: d=-0.30 
Neutral instructions 
CD vs. Normal: d=-0.85; CD vs. Abnormal: d=-0.66 
Between groups-Comfort ratings for CD presentation format* 
Pro-CD vs. anti-CD instructions: d=-0.66; Pro-CD vs. Neutral instructions: d=-0.46 
Between groups-Believability ratings for CD presentation format* 
Pro-CD vs. anti-CD instructions: d=0.02; Pro-CD vs. Neutral instructions: d=-0.95  
(Positive values indicate higher discomfort and lower believability in CD format 
and  
Pro-CD instruction group) 
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Masuda, Hayes, 
Sackett, & Twohig 
(2004) 
 
 No effect size data available 
 
Masuda et al. 
(2009) 
 
No effect size data available 
 
Masuda, Feinstein, 
Wendell, & 
Sheehan (2010) 
Within group 
P-CD: Discomfort, d=0.91; Believability, d=0.95 
F-CD: Discomfort, d=1.57; Believability, d=1.57 (all lower ratings post-
intervention) 
Between group 
P-CD vs. F-CD: Discomfort, d=0.93; Believability, d=0.85 
P-CD vs. P-Distraction: Discomfort, d=-0.19; Believability, d=-0.25 
P-CD vs. F-Distraction: Discomfort, d=-0.13; Believability, d=-0.12 
P-CD vs. Control: Discomfort, d=-0.23; Believability, d=-0.30 
F-CD vs. P-Distraction: Discomfort, d=-1.37; Believability, d=-1.40 
F-CD vs. F-Distraction: Discomfort, d=-1.17; Believability, d=-1.18 
F-CD vs. Control: Discomfort, d=-1.20; Believability, d=-1.28 (F-CD group had 
lower scores post-intervention than all other conditions)  
Subgroup with elevated depressive symptoms (n=71) 
+
 
Within group 
P-CD: Discomfort, d=0.93; Believability, d=1.25 
F-CD: Discomfort, d=1.61; Believability, d=1.32 (All ratings lower post-
intervention) 
Between group 
P-CD vs. F-CD: Discomfort, d=1.21; Believability, d=0.67 
P-CD vs. P-Distraction: Discomfort, d=-0.00; Believability, d=-0.44 
P-CD vs. F-Distraction: Discomfort, d=-0.03; Believability, d=-0.25 
P-CD vs. Control: Discomfort, d=-0.33; Believability, d=-0.51 
F-CD, vs. P-Distraction: Discomfort, d=-1.56; Believability, d=-1.53 
F-CD vs. F-Distraction: Discomfort, d=-1.35; Believability, d=-1.13 
F-CD vs. Control: Discomfort, d=-1.78; Believability, d=-1.58 (F-CD group had 
lower scores post-intervention than all other conditions) 
 
Masuda, et al. 
(2010)  
Within group (CD): discomfort,  d=1.70; believability, d=1.60 (Both lower post-
intervention) 
Between group CD vs. distraction: discomfort, d=-0.54; believability, d=-0.74 
CD vs. control: discomfort, d=-1.13; believability, d=-1.20 (CD group reported 
lower discomfort and believability than distraction and control groups post-
intervention) 
Subgroup with elevated depressive symptoms (n=42) 
+
 
Within group (CD): discomfort, d=1.90; believability, d=1.30 (Both outcomes 
lower post-intervention) 
Between group CD vs. distraction: discomfort, d=-0.30; believability, d=-0.65 
CD vs. control: discomfort, d=-0.93; believability, d=-0.99 (CD group ratings lower 
than distraction and control groups post-intervention) 
 
Pilecki & McKay 
(2012) 
VAS between groups Effect Sizes* 
Disgust ratings for the disgust clip 
CD vs. Suppression (d=0.65); CD vs. Control (d=0.36) 
Sadness ratings for the sadness clip 
CD vs. Suppression (d=0.43); CD vs. Control (d=0.15) 
Anxiety ratings for the anxiety clip 
CD vs. Suppression (d=0.28); CD vs. Control  (d=-0.24) 
Positive scores indicate higher degree of the target emotion in the CD condition 
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Watson, Burley, & 
Purdon (2010) 
Study1 
 
Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within group* 
CD: Pre- vs. Post-intervention, d=0.74; Baseline vs. Follow-up, d=0.34 (decrease in 
negative response index) 
 
Within group* 
CD: Pre- vs. Post-intervention, d=0.73; Baseline vs. Follow-up, d=0.78; Post-
intervention vs. Follow-up, d=0.11 (decrease in negative response index) 
Between groups* 
Post-intervention, CD vs. IE (d=-0.70); CD vs. Control (d=-0.65) 
Follow-up, CD vs. IE (d=-0.52); CD vs. Control (d=-0.88) (CD had lower ratings 
than other 2 groups) 
*Effect sizes calculated by reviewer using Cohen‘s d, ES (d) =      mean 1– mean 2 
                                                                                                    pooled standard deviation 
+Selected using a cut-off score of 10 on the Beck Depression Inventory-II, based on the mean score for the entire sample 
 
3.4.1 Cognitive Defusion versus Alternative Treatment Conditions  
A number of studies compared cognitive defusion to alternative treatment strategies. 
Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, and Wolitzky-Taylor (2011) compared cognitive defusion to 
cognitive restructuring. They found that both strategies produced significant decreases in 
discomfort and believability over time (assessed at pre-rationale, post-rationale, and post-
homework). Effect sizes within the cognitive defusion group were large for both distress 
and believability from pre- to post-rationale, but they revealed little change in either of 
these dependent variables between post-rationale and post-homework. This study did not 
include a control condition. 
 
Two studies compared cognitive defusion to distraction (Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell & 
Sheehan, 2010; Masuda et al., 2010). Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, and Sheehan (2010) 
found that discomfort and believability were significantly lower post-intervention for 
cognitive defusion, distraction, and a control condition (p<.05). This study included two 
cognitive defusion conditions, namely Full and Partial CD. Details of these conditions are 
provided in Table 2. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the Full CD group had 
significantly lower discomfort and believability than the other groups in the study (p<.01). 
Similar results were found with a sub-group of participants in this study with ―elevated 
depressive symptoms‖. Finally, when the two cognitive defusion conditions were 
compared, medium to large effect sizes were found in both the larger group and those with 
elevated depressive symptoms. All of these effect sizes were in favour of the Full CD 
condition.  
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Masuda et al. (2010) also compared cognitive defusion, distraction, and a control 
condition. They found that discomfort at post-intervention was significantly lower across 
all conditions (p<.001). However, the cognitive defusion group reported significantly 
lower discomfort than the other groups (p<.05). The results for believability were almost 
identical. This study also included a sub-analysis of participants with ―elevated depressive 
symptoms‖. Discomfort results revealed a main effect for condition (p<.05). Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the cognitive defusion group had significantly lower discomfort 
than the control condition (p<.01) but not the distraction condition. As regards 
believability, a main effect for time was revealed (p<.001). Pairwise comparisons revealed 
a significant reduction of believability (p<.001). In addition, a large effect size was found 
at post-intervention when comparing believability scores for cognitive defusion and control 
conditions and a medium effect size was found when comparing cognitive defusion and 
distraction. These results favoured the cognitive defusion condition.  
 
 Pilecki and McKay (2012) compared cognitive defusion to thought suppression and a 
control condition. They found no significant difference in self-report ratings of emotional 
response between the three conditions (p=.45). They also employed the Stroop test as an 
indirect measure of emotional arousal. This test indicated that the cognitive defusion group 
were less emotionally aroused than the control condition (p=.01) but there was no 
significant difference between the cognitive defusion and suppression groups (p=.40). 
 
Watson, Burley and Purdon (2010) compared cognitive defusion with imaginal exposure to 
contamination-related words. They also included a control condition. They found that there 
were both significant immediate (p<.001) and long-term decreases (over a week) (p<.01) 
in negative response in the cognitive defusion group. The change in ratings pre- to post-
intervention was greater for the cognitive defusion than the imaginal exposure group 
(p<.001) but the change in ratings from baseline to follow-up (one week later) was 
equivalent for the two groups (p=.27). The cognitive defusion group showed a significantly 
greater decrease in negative response than the control group at both pre- to post-
intervention (p=.001) and baseline to follow-up (p<.05). Watson, Burley and Purdon 
(2010) also conducted a second study, similar to the above. However, this study differed in 
that participants were requested to practise their intervention strategy over the week-long 
follow-up period. There were both significant immediate (p<.001) and long-term decreases 
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(p<.001) in negative response in the cognitive defusion group. At post-intervention, the 
cognitive defusion group had significantly lower ratings than the imaginal exposure and 
control groups (ps<.01). Similar significant results were found at follow-up (ps<.001).  
 
Finally, DeYoung, Lavender, Washington, Looby, and Anderson (2010) compared 
cognitive defusion to an Implicit Associations Task (IAT) and a control condition. This 
study consisted of five conditions, two cognitive defusion conditions, either with or 
without a theoretically consistent rationale. Similarly, the IAT task was presented either 
with or without a rationale. Firstly, cognitive defusion and IAT tasks were compared. A 
significant main effect for time was found in discomfort ratings, such that post-test ratings 
were lower than pre-test ratings (p<.05). Pairwise comparison indicated that both cognitive 
defusion and IAT resulted in significantly lower post-test discomfort (ps<.05). There was 
also a significant time by task interaction (p<.05). Participants performing the cognitive 
defusion task demonstrated a larger decrease in discomfort ratings than those performing 
the IAT task. No main effect for rationale (p=.90) and no time by rationale (p=.83) or task 
by rationale (p=.39) interactions were found. As regards believability, there was again a 
main effect for time. Both cognitive defusion and IAT resulted in significantly lower post-
test believability (ps<.05). No other significant main or interaction effects were detected 
for task or rationale. Secondly, the authors conducted an analysis to compare the active 
treatment conditions to the control condition. None of the changes from pre-to post-test in 
any of the four active treatment groups exceeded the magnitude of regression to the mean 
observed in the control group (all ps>.003, statistical significance level following 
Bonferroni correction).  
 
3.4.2 Comparison solely to Control Conditions  
Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, and Twohig (2004) conducted two experiments, where they 
compared cognitive defusion to a control condition. One of the control conditions was a 
simple distraction task without a rationale, whereas the other control condition attempted 
to control for demand characteristics by providing a rationale for a thought control task. 
Both experiments had repeated measures designs. Cognitive defusion reduced discomfort 
and believability more than the control conditions in both experiments. However, no 
inferential statistics were reported.  
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Participants in Healy et al. (2008) were randomised to one of three conditions, receiving 
pro- or anti-defusion or neutral instructions (between-group factor). All participants were 
presented with statements in a defused, normal, and abnormal format (within-group factor). 
For discomfort, there was no main effect for instruction group (p=.21) or instruction group 
by presentation format interaction effect (p=.17). There was a significant main effect for 
presentation format (p<.0001). Cognitive defusion significantly decreased discomfort 
relative to the normal (p<.0001) and abnormal (p=.0001) formats. For believability, there 
was no main effect for instruction group (p=.12). There was a significant effect for 
presentation format (p<.0001) and a significant interaction effect (p=.003). Post-hoc tests 
revealed that believability was greater for cognitive defusion relative to both normal and 
abnormal presentation formats in all three instruction groups (ps<.05).  
 
3.4.3 No alternative Comparison Condition  
Masuda et al. (2009) compared various durations of verbal repetition (cognitive defusion) 
but did not include any alternative treatment or control condition. Firstly, they assigned 
participants to one of three conditions: (i) defusion rationale only; (ii) rationale and 3 
seconds of verbal repetition; (iii) rationale and 20 seconds of verbal repetition. Results 
revealed that the rationale condition reduced discomfort significantly less than both the 3-
second (p<.001) and the 20-second (p<.001) verbal repetition conditions. However, the 
latter two conditions did not differ (p=.99). The rationale only condition reduced 
believability significantly less than both the 3-second (p<.001) and the 20-second 
conditions (p<.001). Furthermore, the believability of the 20-second condition was 
significantly less than the 3-second condition (p=.002). Masuda et al (2009) conducted a 
second experiment with identical conditions to the first experiment, except that the 
duration of repetition was 1 second, 10 seconds, or 30 seconds. The 1-second condition 
reduced discomfort significantly less than the 10-second (p<.02) and 30-second conditions 
(p<.001), whereas the latter two conditions did not differ significantly (p=.07). The 1-
second condition also reduced believability significantly less than the 10-second (p<.02) 
and 30-second (p=.004) conditions. However, the believability of the latter two conditions 
did not differ (p>.25). Finally, the authors combined those groups from experiments 1 and 
2 that were not significantly different and reanalysed the data. The rationale/1-second 
combination reduced discomfort significantly less than both the 3-second/10-second 
combination (p<.001) and the 20-second/30-second combination (p<.001). The difference 
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between the latter two combinations was not significant (p=.14). The rationale/1-second 
combined group reduced believability significantly less than both the 3-second/10-second 
(p<.001) and the 20-second/30-second combinations (p<.001). The difference between the 
latter two combinations was also significant (p=.006, greater reduction for 20-second/30-
second combination).   
 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Included studies 
As mentioned previously, the Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, and Hayes (2012) meta-analysis 
calculated a medium effect size in favour of cognitive defusion when comparing it to 
inactive conditions. All of the included studies employed the deliteralisation technique of 
verbal repetition. This systematic review includes all of the studies on cognitive defusion 
identified in this meta-analysis plus an additional four studies. Since the Levin, 
Hildebrandt, Lillis, and Hayes (2012) meta-analysis was conducted (included studies up to 
February 2011), two additional studies using deliteralisation-type cognitive defusion have 
been published (Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011; Pilecki & McKay, 
2012). One of these studies used the verbal repetition technique again. The other study 
used an alternative technique, namely labelling thoughts as thoughts by adding the prefix 
―There I go with a thought that…‖. Furthermore, two studies that did not meet the 
inclusion criteria of Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, and Hayes (2012) were included in this 
systematic review. One study provided an experimental test of the cognitive defusion 
exercise of adding the prefix ―I am having the thought that…‖ for coping with negative 
and positive self-statements (Healy et al., 2008). It did not meet the inclusion criteria for 
the above meta-analysis because it did not use a randomised between-groups design (all 
participants were exposed to defusion, normal, and abnormal conditions). Secondly, 
Masuda et al. (2009) manipulated durations of verbal repetition. It did not meet the 
inclusion criteria of Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, and Hayes (2012) because it did not include 
any alternative conditions to cognitive defusion. Therefore, this systematic review updates 
the evidence base regarding laboratory-based component studies of cognitive defusion, 
specifically in relation to deliteralisation-type techniques.    
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4.2 Impact of Cognitive Defusion on Distress and Believability 
All but one of the studies in this review examined the effects of cognitive defusion on 
distress and believability compared to alternative treatment and/or control conditions. 
Cognitive defusion was generally found to have equivalent results to cognitive 
restructuring and thought suppression and superior results to distraction, imaginal exposure 
therapy, and control conditions. Interestingly, one of these studies, Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, 
and Wolitzky-Taylor (2011) found that cognitive defusion and cognitive restructuring 
produced substantial and comparable improvements. One of the limitations of this study 
was that it did not include a control group. Accordingly, these findings may be accounted 
for by placebo effects, social desirability, or regression to the mean. However, given that 
cognitive restructuring is a central component of ―the most clearly established effective 
psychotherapy that exists‖ (Leahy, 2008, p.149), it is promising that cognitive defusion 
produced similar results. As referred to above, Watson, Burley and Purdon (2010) reported 
that cognitive defusion was superior to imaginal exposure in reducing negative responses 
to contamination-related words. Imaginal exposure is a component of Exposure and 
Response Prevention therapy, a treatment for obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) that 
has been found to be at least as effective as pharmacological approaches (Foa & Kozak, 
1996). However, it should be pointed out that the imaginal exposure intervention consisted 
of 30 seconds of imaginal exposure to thoughts about contamination-related words. It is 
likely that this exposure did not have optimal effect, as it is repeated exposures to an 
imagined scenario that leads to a reduction in associated distress (Gillihan, Williams, 
Malcoun, Yadin, & Foa, 2012). Furthermore, participants did not receive any instruction in 
how to conduct imaginal exposure. It is possible that some participants were poor at using 
imagery and would have required training in order to benefit fully from imaginal exposure. 
Therefore, the finding in relation to imaginal exposure appears to be more equivocal than 
what is claimed by the study authors.   
 
There were some exceptions to the positive findings for cognitive defusion. For example, 
Healy et al. (2008) compared cognitive defusion to two control conditions. All participants 
in this study were presented with negative self-statements in a normal format (e.g. I am a 
bad person), an abnormal format (e.g. I have a wooden chair and I am a bad person), and a 
defused format (e.g. I am having the thought that I am a bad person). Unexpectedly, 
believability was higher for the cognitive defusion format relative to the other two formats. 
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However, it was suggested that the believability measure used was problematic. The 
authors proposed that it was likely that participants were responding to the whole defusion 
statement (e.g. how believable is it that you are having the thought that you are a bad 
person?). If this were the case, the increased believability ratings for the defused 
statements would have indicated that the participants believed they were having the 
thought rather than indicating that the thought was true. For this reason, the effects of 
cognitive defusion on believability remained unclear. Furthermore, DeYoung, Lavender, 
Washington, Looby, and Anderson (2010) reported a null finding for cognitive defusion. In 
their study, the cognitive defusion technique of verbal repetition was compared to IAT and 
a control condition. IAT requires that words retain literal meaning in contrast to verbal 
repetition, where a word is repeated aloud quickly until the context required for the word to 
have literal meaning changes. The results indicated that neither cognitive defusion nor IAT 
demonstrated changes beyond what could be accounted for by statistical regression. 
Furthermore, the failure to demonstrate such change was not due to lack of statistical 
power. The authors pointed out that they did not assess the credibility of the rationales 
provided for each technique and therefore it was unclear if lack of rationale credibility was 
responsible for their finding. However, the cognitive defusion rationale resembled the 
script from the Hayes, Strosahl and Wilson (1999) ―milk‖ example. This is similar to the 
other studies of verbal repetition in this review that reported positive findings for cognitive 
defusion (i.e. Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, 
& Twohig, 2004; Masuda et al. 2010, Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan, 2010; 
Watson, Burley & Purdon, 2010). Therefore, it is unclear why the rationale would have 
lacked credibility.  
 
The studies reviewed also reported a number of additional findings about potential 
moderator variables, namely experiential exercises, practice, and duration of verbal 
repetition. Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, and Sheehan (2010) compared two cognitive 
defusion conditions. One comprised a rationale and training (i.e. verbal repetition with a 
neutral word, i.e. ―milk‖), the other comprised the same procedure plus an experiential 
exercise of verbal repetition of a target negative self-referential word (e.g. ―idiot‖). They 
found that the latter technique resulted in lower discomfort and believability of the target 
negative thought. This finding is consistent with the emphasis in ACT on the use of 
experiential exercises (Harris, 2009). 
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Two of the studies included follow-up periods, when participants were asked to practise 
cognitive defusion. Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, and Wolitzky-Taylor (2011) included a follow-
up period of one week, during which participants were asked to practise their assigned 
intervention. Effect sizes within the cognitive defusion group were large for both distress 
and believability immediately post-intervention. However, effect sizes revealed that there 
was little change in these outcome variables over the follow-up period. Watson, Burley and 
Purdon (2010) also included a one-week follow-up period, when participants were 
requested to practise cognitive defusion with contamination-related thoughts. The effect 
size for this follow-up period again indicated little change in negative response to these 
thoughts. These results suggest that practice of cognitive defusion over a longer time 
period might not improve outcomes.  
 
Finally, Masuda et al. (2009) found that both discomfort and believability of negative 
thoughts varied systematically with the duration of word repetition. Emotional discomfort 
went down relatively quickly and repetition in the 3- to 10-second range was effective. 
Meanwhile, the reduction of believability took longer, reaching its maximum in the 20- to 
30-second range.  
 
4.3 Limitations 
One of the limitations of the review relates to its focus on cognitive defusion techniques 
that try to reduce the literal quality of thoughts and the exclusion of techniques targeted at 
letting thoughts come and go and being non-judgmental regarding thoughts. As pointed out 
by Forman et al. (2012), cognitive defusion is linked with a perspective of non-judgmental 
acceptance toward experience in the ACT model. However, as mentioned previously, it 
was decided to exclude studies taking this perspective because of the overlap with 
acceptance and mindfulness techniques. Therefore, the findings reported in this review do 
not generalise to all of the various ways in which cognitive defusion can be conceptualised 
within ACT. Furthermore, it is possible that cognitive defusion examined in these studies 
was less effective when delivered in isolation from the broader therapeutic context in 
which it is typically implemented. On the other hand, studying therapeutic techniques in 
isolation avoids the ambiguities inherent in evaluating large treatment packages composed 
27 
 
of different procedures, some of which may be unhelpful (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, 
& Lillis, 2006). 
 
Another limitation of this review relates to the way it focused specifically on the effects of 
cognitive defusion on distress and believability. It excluded studies that did not include 
either of these measures. Studies by Hooper and McHugh (2013) and Hooper, Sandoz, 
Ashton, Clark, and McHugh (2012) both met this exclusion criterion. These studies 
examined the effects of cognitive defusion as a coping technique for food cravings and for 
unwanted thoughts during a learned helplessness preparation. The outcomes measures used 
were amount of chocolate eaten during a chocolate abstinence period and completion time 
on a maze task following the learned helplessness preparation. Furthermore, there were 
outcome measures additional to distress and believability in the included studies (e.g. 
willingness). However, as mentioned previously, none of the other outcomes measures 
were used as frequently as distress or believability.  
 
Due to practical issues related to accessing unpublished materials, only studies from peer-
reviewed publications were included in this review. Empirical research consistently 
suggests that published work is more likely to be statistically significant than unpublished 
research (Dickersin & Min, 1993), which leads to an overestimation of treatment effects. 
Therefore, this inclusion criterion introduced a potential publication bias in the findings. 
However, it ensured that the studies included met the quality standards required for peer-
review publication. In addition, only publications in English were considered in this 
review. This also had the potential to introduce bias, as relevant non-English studies might 
have been excluded. 
 
One of the limitations of the studies included in the review relates to their generalisability 
to clinical populations. All the studies were conducted with a young student population. It 
is likely that the student participants differed on a number of sociodemographic variables 
from clinical populations, such as age, social class, and education level. Furthermore, 
samples were at best analogue studies (i.e. Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 
2011; Watson, Burley & Purdon, 2010) for clinical populations. The majority of studies 
consisted of non-clinical samples. Two of these studies (Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & 
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Sheehan, 2010; Masuda et al., 2010) included sub-analyses of participants, who met a cut-
off score of 10 on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II). These participants were 
described as having ―elevated depressive symptoms‖. However, a score of 10 on the BDI-
II is still within the ―minimal depression‖ range. Therefore, it is possible that some of this 
subgroup did not even experience a mild level of depressive symptoms. However, there is 
evidence to suggest that convenience samples such as those employed in the studies in this 
review can provide valuable information that is relevant to clinical populations. Levin, 
Hildebrandt, Lillis, and Hayes (2012) commented that given the frequent use of 
convenience samples, a potential concern with laboratory-based component studies was 
that the findings might not apply to distressed or at-risk samples. Consequently, they tested 
for statistically significant differences between the effect sizes for distressed or at-risk 
samples (consisting of individuals with current or past psychological disorders, elevated 
symptoms, or important risk factors) versus convenience samples (university students, 
members of the community in general). The findings suggested that laboratory-based 
studies evaluating ACT components produced similar results with at-risk/distressed and 
convenience samples.  
 
Another limitation of the included studies is that they all employed self-report, 
idiosyncratic measures. It is impossible to comment on the psychometric properties of 
idiosyncratic measures, namely reliability and validity. Indeed, Healy et al. (2008) 
proposed that their unexpected finding regarding increased believability for defused 
statements might have been the result of an invalid measure of believability. Furthermore, 
the use of self-report measures can introduce biases, such as social desirability and demand 
characteristics. Pilecki and McKay (2012) was the only study that included a measure that 
was not self-report. They employed the Stroop test as an indirect measure of emotional 
arousal. This test is able to detect subtle differences in attention and concentration, 
processes shown to be susceptible to interference during emotional arousal (MacLeod, 
1991). The authors highlighted that this task had the advantage of being devoid of 
experimenter expectancies. As mentioned previously, the cognitive defusion group were 
found to be less emotionally aroused than the control group on the Stroop test.   
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4.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the studies reviewed provide positive findings in the main regarding the 
effects of cognitive defusion on distress and believability. One study (Healy et al., 2008) 
found that a cognitive defusion technique increased believability of negative thoughts. 
However, it seems likely that this finding was an artefact of the way in which believability 
was measured. Another study did, however, find that cognitive defusion was no better than 
a control condition (De Young, Lavender, Washington, Looby, & Anderson, 2010). 
Otherwise, cognitive defusion has been shown to produce superior results to distraction 
(Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan, 2010; Masuda et al., 2010) and imaginal 
exposure (Watson, Burley & Purdon, 2010) and similar results to other active treatment 
conditions, namely cognitive restructuring (Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 
2011) and suppression (Pilecki & McKay, 2012). Other findings in this literature 
highlighted that practice over time does not necessarily improve the effectiveness of 
cognitive defusion (Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011; Watson, Burley & 
Purdon, 2010). Experiential exercise with cognitive defusion techniques appears to be 
important (Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan, 2010). Finally, one of the studies (De 
Young, Lavender, Washington, Looby, & Anderson, 2010) examined the effect of 
providing a rationale for the cognitive defusion technique of verbal repetition. This did not 
improve performance of the technique. Masuda et al. (2009) differed from the other studies 
in that it did not include a comparison condition. They found that the optimal duration of 
verbal repetition was 3-10 seconds to reduce discomfort and 20-30 seconds to reduce 
believability. Given the promising findings in relation to cognitive defusion described in 
this review and the dearth of research in the area, it would seem that further research into 
this therapeutic technique is warranted.  
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Plain Language Summary 
 
 
Aims of Study 
The aim of this study was to find out what happens when people are asked to ―suppress‖ or 
―defuse‖ from their unpleasant thoughts. Suppressing thoughts means asking people not to 
think about something. Some research has shown that this can paradoxically cause an 
increase in the frequency of thoughts. Defusion involves seeing thoughts as nothing more 
or less than words that are made up of sounds, and thinking about how helpful thoughts are 
rather than how true they are. It tries to create some distance between people and their 
thoughts so that their behaviour is not overly-influenced by thought content. Presently, 
there is relatively limited research looking at defusion. This study is interested in a 
particular type of thought experienced in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), called an 
obsession. This is an unpleasant and unwanted thought that pops into people‘s minds 
unexpectedly. One example would be ―I left the cooker switched on‖. 
 
What the Study Involved 
Students at the University of Glasgow, who were frequently experiencing this type of 
intrusive thought, were asked to participate. They were randomly split into two groups: (1) 
suppression and (2) defusion. They were asked to record how many times they had 
intrusive thoughts over a six-day period. They also provided ratings about their distress 
levels and their views of these thoughts. On the middle two days of the experiment (days 
three and four), participants in the suppression group were asked to try as hard as possible 
not to think about their intrusive thought. Those in the defusion group were taught a simple 
defusion strategy. Whenever they had their intrusive thought, they were asked to repeat it 
silently in their head with this phrase in front of it, ―I notice I am having the thought that 
…‖.  
 
Results 
Both groups reported fewer intrusive thoughts in the two days after suppression and 
defusion (days 5 and 6) and there was no change in distress or believability of the intrusive 
thoughts over the six days. In addition, both groups generally had more favourable views 
of their unwanted intrusive thoughts after the experiment.  
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Conclusions 
The findings for the suppression group go against psychological theories of OCD, which 
say that thought suppression causes more intrusive thoughts to occur. It appeared that 
people in this study were using helpful ways to control their thoughts when they were 
asked to suppress them over the two days. In addition, the promising findings for the group 
that used defusion suggest that it may be worthwhile conducting more research in this area. 
Overall, the findings of this study may help to improve theories of OCD and treatments for 
intrusive obsessional thoughts. 
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Abstract 
 
Background: Thought suppression has been implicated in the development and 
maintenance of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Based on Wegner, Schneider, 
Carter, and White‘s (1987) research, suppression is widely viewed to lead to a paradoxical 
increase in thought frequency. However, further research evidence has been inconsistent 
and its interpretation has been hindered by methodological limitations of studies. Cognitive 
defusion offers a possible alternative method of managing intrusive thoughts. Although 
cognitive defusion strategies are frequently used within an Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT) based clinical context, the empirical evidence to support their efficacy is 
relatively limited. 
Aims: To employ a naturalistic experimental design to compare the effects of suppression 
and a cognitive defusion technique on thought frequency and distress in a non-clinical, 
highly obsessional cohort.  
Methods: A cohort of 49 participants, screened for obsessional intrusions, completed a 6-
day experiment. They were randomly allocated to a suppression (n=24) or cognitive 
defusion (n=25) group. The experiment involved three phases, each lasting two days: (1) 
baseline monitoring of intrusive thought occurrences; (2) experimental instruction 
(suppression or cognitive defusion); and (3) a return to simply monitoring thought 
occurrences. 
Results:  This study demonstrated that thought suppression did not lead to a paradoxical 
increase in thought frequency. Furthermore, there was a reduction in thought frequency in 
Phase 3 of the study for both groups and participants also generally had more favourable 
appraisals of their intrusive thoughts following the experiment. 
Conclusions:  The findings for thought suppression have implications for the refinement 
of thought control strategies used during suppression and the theoretical models and 
treatments of OCD that highlight the harmful effects of suppression. In addition, the 
promising findings for cognitive defusion suggest that further research in this area is 
warranted. 
 
Keywords:  Thought Suppression; Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; Cognitive Defusion 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Unwanted intrusive thoughts emerge as symptoms across a range of disorders, from OCD 
to generalised anxiety disorder and depression (Clark, 2005). The focus in this study was 
on intrusive thoughts in OCD. Leading cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) models of 
OCD implicate suppression (i.e. trying not to think about something) as key in the 
development and maintenance of this disorder. For example, Salkovskis argues that 
thoughts give rise to active resistance when they activate overvalued beliefs that thoughts 
can cause harm, and that the individual is bound to prevent harm, even if his/her 
responsibility for harm is minute and uncertain (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1998; Salkovskis, 
Richards, & Forrester, 1995; Salkovskis et al., 2000). Thus, individuals must control 
thoughts that signify potential harm in order to prevent harm and the aversive sense that 
they may otherwise become responsible for harm. Furthermore, Rachman proposes that 
active resistance arises from beliefs that a thought about an immoral action is equivalent to 
performing that action (moral thought-action fusion) and that having thoughts about an 
event increases the likelihood of that event happening (likelihood thought-action fusion) 
(Rachman, 1997, 1998; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). The individual attempts to control 
the thought because it offends her/his moral sensibilities both by its occurrence and 
because it may increase the likelihood of morally objectionable events occurring. 
 
However, suppression is commonly believed to lead to a paradoxical increase in thought 
frequency since Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White‘s (1987) classic ―white bear‖ 
studies. In these studies, participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups, each 
completing two five-minute conditions in counterbalanced order: 1) trying not to think of a 
white bear (suppression); 2) trying to think of a white bear (expression). It was found that 
during suppression, participants were unable to suppress white bear thoughts fully. 
Furthermore, thought occurrences were more frequent in the expression period following 
initial suppression than in the initial expression period. Therefore, it was suggested that 
suppression produced what has been called the ―rebound effect‖. Further research 
demonstrated an increase in thought frequency during the act of suppression (e.g. Lavy & 
van den Hout, 1990), known as the ―immediate enhancement effect‖.  
 
Research evidence in this area has, however, been inconsistent. The author of a systematic 
review of the effects of thought suppression on OCD (McLean, 2006) concluded that there 
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was no firm experimental evidence that suppression of OCD-type intrusions led to a 
rebound effect and that there was limited support for an immediate enhancement effect. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of findings in this area has been hampered by 
methodological limitations of some of the published studies. Key limitations identified in 
reviews by Purdon (2004), McLean (2006), and Abramowitz, Tolin, and Street (2001) 
include a lack of studies in clinical populations, studies that have used emotionally neutral 
thoughts, a reliance on lab-based experimental sessions, and lack of appropriate control 
conditions. Ralston (2011) addressed some of these limitations in a study that examined the 
impact of thought suppression on intrusive thought frequency and distress in a non-clinical, 
highly obsessional cohort. This study involved participants monitoring personally-relevant 
intrusive thoughts in their natural environments and included a control condition. 
Participants were randomly split into two groups: a) suppression and b) monitor only.  For 
each day, over the course of the week, participants kept a record of how often they 
experienced their intrusive thoughts and provided ratings of associated anxiety. On days 
three and four, the suppression group were asked to try as hard as possible not to think 
about their personally-relevant intrusive thought. The suppression group reported fewer 
intrusive thoughts during and after suppression and less anxiety compared to the monitor 
only group.  Accordingly, this study failed to provide support for immediate enhancement 
or rebound effects of thought suppression.  
  
Cognitive defusion offers a possible alternative method of managing intrusive thoughts. It 
is a core element of ACT. In ACT, clients are encouraged to make willing contact with 
aversive psychological content. Cognitive defusion techniques are often employed in ACT 
interventions to achieve this. ACT explicitly states that the modification of problematic 
private events in function, and not in form or frequency, is the aim of treatment (Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). From an ACT perspective, clients are frequently fused with 
painful or negatively evaluated psychological content and defusion strategies create a 
defused perspective that allows greater behavioural flexibility. Titchener‘s (1916) rapid 
word-repetition technique is perhaps the most well-known method for facilitating defusion. 
Within ACT, clients are encouraged to repeat negative words rapidly (e.g. ―stupid, stupid, 
stupid‖). The therapeutic aim of this strategy is that, during the repetition task, the 
semantic functions (i.e. meaning) of the word will be significantly reduced. Clients have 
reported that towards the end of the exercise they experience the words simply as a strange 
sound (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). The therapist then uses this experience to 
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highlight that the client‘s negative thought content is purely verbal and not a reflection of 
reality.  
 
Although cognitive defusion strategies are frequently used within an ACT-based clinical 
context, the empirical evidence to support their efficacy is relatively limited (Healy et al., 
2008). Watson, Burley, and Purdon (2010) examined the effects of the cognitive defusion 
strategy of verbal repetition on appraisal of contamination-related thoughts, typical of 
those experienced by individuals with OCD. They compared verbal repetition to brief 
imaginal exposure and no intervention (control). In the verbal repetition condition, 
participants were asked to engage in 30 seconds of repeating contamination words (e.g. 
disease, germs) loudly and as fast as possible. Those in the imaginal exposure condition 
were asked to imagine scenes involving contamination words for 30 seconds. Participants 
in the control condition were requested to sit quietly. Following the intervention, 
participants in the verbal repetition and imaginal exposure groups were asked to practise 
their intervention over the next week. Results showed that relative to imaginal exposure 
and control conditions, verbal repetition was associated with a greater decrease in negative 
appraisal ratings (believability, meaningfulness, distress) at post-intervention and at 
follow-up (1 week later). Positive findings for cognitive defusion have also been reported 
in relation to self-referential negative thoughts (Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-
Taylor, 2011; Healy et al., 2008; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004; Masuda et al., 
2009, Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan 2010; Masuda, et al., 2010). One limitation 
of these studies is that they were laboratory-based experiments, apart from the follow-up 
periods employed in Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, and Wolitzky-Taylor (2011) and Watson, 
Burley, and Purdon (2010). Therefore, they are somewhat lacking in ecological validity.   
 
1.2 Rationale 
The current study compared the effectiveness of suppression and cognitive defusion in 
participants‘ day-to-day environment over a period of six days. It improved on 
methodological limitations in the existing literature. Specifically, it employed a longer 
experimental period, incorporated a baseline monitoring period, and took place in the 
participant‘s natural environment. The study also recruited an analogue sample of 
41 
 
participants, who rated highly for obsessionality, and asked them to monitor personally 
relevant intrusive thoughts. 
 
 
1.3 Aims and hypotheses 
1.3.1 Aims 
To employ a naturalistic experimental design to compare the effects of thought suppression 
and a cognitive defusion technique on thought frequency and distress in a non-clinical, 
highly obsessional cohort. It was anticipated that findings would have clinical implications 
relevant to both traditional CBT and ACT-based interventions for OCD. 
 
1.3.2 Hypotheses 
The instruction to suppress intrusive thoughts would: 
  increase intrusive thought frequency during suppression and in the subsequent 
monitoring phase relative to baseline. That is, immediate enhancement and 
rebound effects were predicted.  
 increase distress during suppression and in the subsequent monitoring phase 
relative to baseline. 
The instruction to defuse from intrusive thoughts would:  
 not result in any change in intrusive thought frequency. 
 decrease distress during the defusion phase relative to baseline. 
 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Design  
The study had an experimental 2 (group) x 3 (phase) mixed model design. Participants 
were randomised to a suppression or defusion condition. Sixty envelopes were prepared, 
half with ―S‖ written inside, the other half with ―CD‖. Participants selected one of the 
sealed envelopes and were assigned to an experimental group accordingly. The experiment 
took place over a 6-day period. Participants were asked to monitor their intrusive thoughts 
for an initial two days (baseline monitoring phase). They were then asked to suppress these 
thoughts or employ a cognitive defusion technique for the following two days. On the final 
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two days, they were asked to return to simply monitoring their thoughts. The baseline 
monitoring period allowed participants to act as their own controls. The dependent 
variables were intrusion frequency, associated distress and believability, and appraisals of 
intrusions. The primary dependent variable was thought frequency.  
 
 
2.2 Ethical Approval 
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Glasgow Ethics Committee in 
September 2012 (see approval documentation in Appendix 2.1). An amendment was made 
to the ethics application in January 2013 to allow the researcher to include individuals 
scoring within the severe range on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). 
Approval was granted for this amendment, provided that the researcher nominated an 
independent person as a support contact for participants, rather than the researcher being 
the sole support contact. Consequently, a clinical psychologist was identified, whose 
contact details were provided to participants.  
 
 
2.3 Power Calculation 
Power calculations using G-POWER (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) were completed 
to determine the required sample size based on the primary hypothesis. This hypothesis 
predicted a significant effect of experimental group (suppression, defusion) on thought 
frequency over three time points using repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Methodology employed in previous research was not sufficiently comparable to estimate 
effect sizes for the current study. Therefore, Cohen‘s effect size (f) conventions for 
ANOVA (Cohen, 1977, 1988) were used with values of  0.1, 0.25, and 0.4 corresponding 
to small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. The following assumptions were 
made: rho was conservatively predicted to be 0.3; and significance level was taken as .05. 
Results indicated that for ―medium‖ effect sizes, a total sample size of 44 would have 
adequate power (>0.80). Therefore, the researcher aimed to have 30 participants in each 
group to allow for participants dropping out of the study or not completing measures.  
 
 
2.4 Participants 
Students from various colleges (i.e. College of Arts, College of Medicine, Veterinary, and 
Life Sciences, College of Science and Engineering) at the University of Glasgow were sent 
43 
 
an invitation email asking if they experienced intrusive thoughts and if they would like to 
participate in a study about such thoughts (Appendix 2.2). A link to an electronic screening 
questionnaire, namely the Obsessional Intrusions Subscale of the Clark-Beck Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory (CBOCI; Clark & Beck, 2002), and a participant information sheet 
(Appendix 2.3) was provided. Between November 2012 and May 2013, 169 students 
completed the screening measure, 147 of whom met inclusion criteria, defined as a score of 
≥ 12 on the Obsessions Subscale of the CBOCI (equating to one standard deviation below 
the clinical mean). Suitable individuals were then contacted by email or telephone. 
Individuals receiving current psychiatric or psychological treatment were excluded from 
further participation in the study (n=4), 11 declined further participation, and it was not 
possible to contact 64 individuals. One additional student was excluded at this stage, as she 
was conducting research in a similar area. Therefore, it was felt that she could potentially 
bias the results. Finally, four individuals, who had completed the online survey, were 
thanked for their participation in this stage of the study but told that they would not be 
required to participate in the experimental stage. The reason being that by this point, it was 
deemed that a sufficient sample size had been achieved. 
 
Appointments to meet with the researcher were arranged with 63 individuals in total. Of 
these, one was excluded because she scored within the severe range for anxiety on the 
HADS (before the amendment to the ethics application was approved). Two further 
individuals could not identify a personally-relevant intrusive thought for use in the study 
and were therefore excluded. The remaining 60 individuals gave written informed consent 
(see Consent form in Appendix 2.4) and were randomised into the study.   
 
 
2.5 Measures 
Clark-Beck Obsessive Compulsive Inventory - Obsessional Intrusions Subscale (CBOCI; 
Clark & Beck, 2002)   
The CBOCI is a 25-item screen for the frequency and severity of Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders - 4th edition (DSM-IV) obsessive and compulsive symptoms, 
designed to complement the Beck Depression Inventory-II. The CBOCI consists of 
validated subscales for obsessions and compulsions with each item rated on a 4-point scale 
(0-3). The measure demonstrates excellent internal consistency (α=0.95), good convergent 
validity (r=0.78), and adequately distinguishes between clinical and non-clinical 
individuals.       
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Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al, 2002)  
The OCI-R is a revision of the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (OCI; Foa, Kozak, 
Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998). It consists of 18 items assessing the severity and 
frequency of OCD symptoms. Each item is rated on a 5-point scale according to level of 
distress. The OCI-R demonstrates good internal consistency (α=0.81). A cut-off score of 
21 distinguishes OCD clients from non-anxious controls (Foa et al., 2002).   
 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
The HADS is a fourteen-item scale. Seven of the items relate to anxiety and seven relate to 
depression. It has been found to perform well in assessing the symptom severity of anxiety 
disorders and depression in the general population (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 
2002). 
 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994) 
The TCQ is a 30-item questionnaire used to assess frequency of thought control strategies 
on a 4-point scale. The TCQ has 5 subscales (worry, distraction, punishment, social 
support, and reappraisal), which possess adequate internal consistency (α=0.64-0.83; Wells 
& Davies, 1994). 
 
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011) 
The AAQ-II is a 7-item questionnaire designed to assess the construct referred to variously 
as acceptance, experiential avoidance, and psychological inflexibility. Results indicate 
satisfactory structure, reliability, and validity of this measure (Bond et al., 2011). 
 
Appraisals of intrusions (e.g. unpleasant, unacceptable) were measured using Visual 
Analogue Scales (VAS) (Appendix 2.5). Appraisal items were based on questions from 
Part II of the Revised Obsessional Intrusions Inventory (ROII, Purdon & Clark, 1994). 
 
Frequency of intrusive thoughts was measured by a hand-held golf tally counter. This 
method has been employed previously in studies of intrusive thoughts (e.g. McLean & 
Broomfield, 2007; Marcks & Woods, 2005). 
 
A Daily Diary (Appendix 2.6) was provided to participants to record thought frequency, 
VAS ratings of believability and distress associated with intrusive thoughts, as well as 
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compliance with and ease of use regarding the suppression and cognitive defusion 
instructions. 
 
 
2.6 Procedure 
The experimental phase of the study was conducted over a 6-day period for each 
participant (see Figure 1 below). The researcher met with participants on a one-to-one 
basis at the start and end of this period. At the pre-experimental meeting, participants 
provided demographic data and completed baseline measurements for the HADS, OCI-R, 
and AAQ-II. The researcher then read out a description of an intrusive thought (Appendix 
2.7) before asking participants to identify a personally-relevant intrusive thought 
experienced within the past week and which was likely to be still bothering them over the 
upcoming week. The thought description was based on instructions from the Interpretation 
of Intrusions Inventory (III; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005). If 
participants experienced difficulty identifying an intrusive thought, they were provided 
with part one of the ROII as a prompt to help identify one. If this was unsuccessful, they 
were excluded from the study. Once a personally-relevant intrusive thought was identified 
as a target thought for the purposes of the study, participants were asked to think about this 
thought for 30 seconds as a priming exercise before completing the VAS-based appraisals 
of the thought. They were then given both verbal and written instructions for the baseline 
thought monitoring period and a copy of the Daily Diary. Following randomisation to 
suppression or cognitive defusion, participants were provided with sealed envelopes with 
instructions for their allocated group and for the final thought monitoring period. 
Participants were requested to open their instructions on the relevant days (i.e. days 3 & 5). 
They also received a text message on the morning of these days as a reminder to open their 
envelopes. See Appendices 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 for descriptions of how instructions were 
provided to participants for thought monitoring, suppression, and cognitive defusion. 
 
At the post-experimental meeting, it was checked if participants had received the text 
messages to open their envelopes. The researcher also checked if participants had received 
the correct set of instructions (i.e. suppression or cognitive defusion). They were then 
asked to complete the same priming exercise and VAS questionnaire as at the pre-
experimental meeting. Participants in the suppression group were also asked to complete 
the Thought Control Questionnaire, as it related to strategies employed on days three and 
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four of the experiment. Finally, all participants were debriefed about the study and thanked 
for their time.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Study Schedule 
Suppression Group Cognitive Defusion 
Group 
Baseline Monitoring 
Period (Days 1 + 2) 
Baseline Monitoring 
Period (Days 1 + 2) 
Suppression Period 
(Days 3 + 4) 
Cognitive Defusion 
Period (Days 3 + 4) 
Monitoring Period 
(Days 5 + 6) 
Monitoring Period  
(Days 5 + 6) 
Random assignment at 
pre-experimental meeting 
Post-experimental meeting 
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2.7 Data Analysis 
Raw data were anonymised and then analysed using PASW Statistics 18. Independent t-
tests for continuous data and Chi-squared tests for categorical data were used to examine 
differences between groups. Mann-Whitney U tests were used for data that were not 
normally distributed. To examine the main hypotheses, each dependent variable was 
analysed using a mixed 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA. Pre- and post-experimental 
appraisal ratings were analysed using mixed 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs. Data were 
first tested for normality. Where appropriate, transformations were employed. The 
assumptions of sphericity (p>.05) and homogeneity of variance (p>.05) were met for 
dependent variables, unless otherwise specified. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Preliminary Analyses 
Sixty participants were randomised to either a suppression (S) or cognitive defusion (CD) 
group. Six of these participants (S=3, CD=3) were excluded from the final analysis due to 
reporting a low number of thoughts throughout the week (total of ≤5 thoughts). These 
participants were not deemed to meet criteria for ‗high obsessionality‘. Another participant 
(S) was excluded because she counted her compulsive behaviours rather than her intrusive 
thoughts. Two participants (S=1, CD=1) withdrew from the experiment and a further two 
participants (S=1, CD=1) were excluded as it came to light post-randomisation that they 
were being treated by a psychologist or psychiatrist. Therefore, a total of 49 participants 
were included in the final analysis (S=24, CD=25).  Participants who had incomplete diary 
ratings were excluded from analysis of the corresponding variables. 
 
3.1.1 Participant Characteristics 
Table 1 details participant characteristics for each group. Median scores are presented for 
age, CBOCI, and HADS (depression) scores, as these data were not normally distributed. 
Participants in both groups scored within the ―mild to moderate clinical‖ range on the 
intrusions subscale of the CBOCI, a symptom-screening instrument. They also scored 
above the recommended clinical cut-off score of 21 on the OCI-R (indicates the likely 
presence of OCD). HADS scores indicated that participants were on average in the 
―normal‖ range for depression and at the upper end of the ―mild‖ range for anxiety. AAQ2 
48 
 
scores suggested probable clinical distress. No significant differences were found between 
groups regarding gender, age, or scores on the CBOCI-Intrusions Subscale, OCI-R, HADS, 
or AAQ2. 
 
Table 1  
Participant Characteristics and Corresponding Analysis  
 
Characteristic  Suppression 
(n=24) 
Cognitive 
Defusion (n=25) 
Statistic 
 
Sex (F:M ratio) 
 
19:5 
 
18:7 
 
χ² =0.6, p=.80 
 
Age (median, IQR) 22.50 (5.75) 21.00 (3.50) U=251.00, z=-0.99, p=.32 
 
CBOCI-Intrusions (median, IQR) 
 
15.50 (7.00) 18.00 (9.00) U= 230.50,  z= -1.40,  p=.16 
 
OCI-R (mean, SD) 24.83 (14.12) 25.04 (13.10) t=-0.05, p=.96 
 
HADS-Depression (median, IQR) 
 
3.50 (4.75) 4.00 (4.00) U=248.50, z=-1.04 , p=.30 
HADS-Anxiety (mean, SD) 
 
AAQ2 (mean, SD) 
10.20 (3.51) 
 
25.91 (8.43) 
10.84 (3.48) 
 
27.44 (7.48) 
t  =-0.63, p=.53 
 
t=-0.67, p=.51 
 
 
The content of participants‘ target intrusive thoughts is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Content of Intrusive Thoughts 
 
Intrusion Type n 
 
The thought that something bad will happen because you were not careful enough  
 
Thought of harming self or others despite not wanting to hurt self/others 
 
Thoughts about contamination/dirt 
 
Thought of something bad happening to a loved one 
 
Thought that objects are not arranged perfectly 
 
Thought of doing something inappropriate or embarrassing 
 
Thoughts questioning feelings for intimate partner  
 
Unwanted/inappropriate sexual thoughts 
 
Thoughts that are contrary to personal moral beliefs 
 
Other 
 
12 
 
12 
 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
7 
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3.1.2 Compliance with Experimental Instructions 
Effort ratings during Phase 2 were examined to measure compliance with the experimental 
instructions. The median scores for the Suppression and Cognitive Defusion groups were 
79.25 (IQR=34.50) and 69.50 (IQR=23.75), respectively. Effort ratings did not differ 
significantly between the two groups (U=248.50, z=-1.03, p=.30). Participants were also 
asked how easy they found it to follow the experimental instructions in Phase 2. There was 
a significant difference in scores for the Suppression (M=56.40, SD=27.45) and Cognitive 
Defusion groups (M=71.52, SD=18.18) [t(47)=-2.28, p< .05)], with the Cognitive Defusion 
group finding the instructions easier to follow.  
 
3.2 Tests of the Main Hypotheses 
To examine the main hypotheses, variables corresponding to target thought occurrences 
and distress were analysed using mixed 2 (Group: Suppression, Cognitive Defusion) by 3 
(Time: Phase 1, Phase2, Phase 3) repeated measures ANOVAs. An identical ANOVA was 
applied to the believability variable. Table 3 provides a summary of the main findings from 
the experimental week.   
 
 
Table 3 
Diary Ratings of Target Intrusion across Groups and Experimental Phases 
 
Dependent Variable  Suppression (n=24) 
Median (IQR) 
Cognitive Defusion (n=25) 
Median (IQR) 
Phase 1: Monitor   
Tally frequency (number of thoughts) 6.00 (13.25) 5.50 (10.00) 
Time spent thinking about intrusion (0-100) 23.75 (25.38) 25.00 (21.75) 
Distress (0-100) 26.00 (25.00) 35.50 (38.50) 
Believability (0-100) 35.25 (43.38) 26.00 (56.50) 
 
Phase 2: Experimental Phase 
  
Tally frequency (number of thoughts) 7.00 (6.75) 6.00 (6.50) 
Time spent thinking about intrusion (0-100) 27.25 (34.25) 25.50 (32.50) 
Distress (0-100) 21.25 (28.75) 38.50 (37.00) 
Believability (0-100) 35.25 (31.88) 29.00 (48.25) 
   
Phase 3: Monitor   
Tally frequency (number of thoughts) 4.50 (7.25) 4.50 (6.25) 
Time spent thinking about intrusion (0-100) 15.50 (19.00) 24.50 (33.50) 
Distress (0-100) 18.50 (34.00) 27.00 (25.75) 
Believability (0-100) 25.50 (43.50) 18.00 (39.50) 
 
Notes: Each phase consisted of 2 days. An average VAS score was calculated over the 2 days. 
           Tally frequency score is the total number of thoughts for each phase. 
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3.2.1 Effects on Thought Frequency and Time Spent thinking about Intrusive Thoughts 
At the post-experimental meeting, participants were asked to estimate the accuracy of their 
tally counter scores from 0 to 100%. The median score was 90% (IQR=13.75). 
Furthermore, participants were asked to provide an estimate of the number of their 
intrusive thoughts at the end of each day during the experimental week. The correlations 
between tally counter scores and these estimates at Phase 1 (rs=.98, n=46, p<.001), Phase 2 
(rs=.93, n=46, p<.001), and Phase 3 (rs=.85, n=45, p<.001) were all significant, suggesting 
that the tally counter scores provided a valid measure of number of intrusive thoughts.  
 
Four outliers in the tally frequency data were changed to be one unit above the next highest 
score, as recommended in Field (2009). A square root transformation was then applied. No 
significant Phase x Group interaction effect was found, [F(2, 88)=1.49, p=.23, partial 
η2=.03]. Similarly, no significant main effect was found for Group [F(1, 44)= 0.24, p=.63, 
partial η2=.01]. A significant main effect was found for Phase [F(2, 88)=3.72, p<.05, 
partial η2=.08]. Pairwise comparisons were conducted employing Bonferroni adjustment 
for multiple comparisons. These comparisons revealed that tally counter scores were 
significantly lower in Phase 3 than in Phase 1 (p<.05). There were no significant 
differences between Phases 1 and 2 (p=1.00) or Phases 2 and 3 (p=.17) (see Figure 2). 
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Note: Box lengths represent interquartile ranges and lines across the inside of boxes are the median 
values.  
 
 
Fig. 2: Tally Counter scores across Phases 
 
 
A second measure of target thought occurrences was employed, namely time spent 
thinking about the thought. A log transformation was applied to these data. No significant 
effects were found for Phase [F(2, 92) = 0.95, p=.39, partial η2=.02], Group [F(1, 
46)=1.35, p=.25, partial η2=.03], or Phase x Group interaction [F(2, 92)=1.33, p=.27, 
partial η2=.03]. 
 
3.2.2 Effects on Distress 
A square root transformation was applied to distress scores. No significant effects were 
found for Phase [F(2, 92)= 0.88,  p=.42, partial η2=.02], Group [F(1, 46)= 2.26, p=.14, 
partial η2=.05], or Phase x Group interaction [F(2, 92)=0.01, p=.99, partial η2=.00]. 
 
 
 
Tally 
Counter 
score 
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3.3 Test of additional variable - Believability 
A log transformation was applied to believability scores. Transformed believability scores 
for Phases 2 and 3 failed to meet the assumption of homogeneity of variance. However, it 
should be noted that sample sizes were substantial and almost equivalent across the two 
groups (Suppression, n=23; Cognitive defusion, n=25). In any event, no significant effects 
were found for Phase [F(2, 92)=1.58, p=.21, partial η2=.03], Group [F(1, 46)= 0.69, p=.41, 
partial η2=.02], or Phase x Group interaction [F(2, 92)=0.27, p=.76, partial η2=.01]. 
 
3.4 Thought Control Strategies 
Participants in the Suppression group were asked to complete the Thought Control 
Questionnaire in relation to the strategies they used to suppress their intrusive thoughts 
during Phase 2. As can be seen from Table 4, distraction was the most frequently 
employed thought control strategy, whereas social control (i.e. discussing the thought with 
others) was the least frequently used strategy.  
 
Table 4 
Thought Control Strategies employed by Suppression Group in Phase 2  
 
TCQ Sub Scale 
(Possible Range = 6-24) 
 (n=24) 
Md (IQR) 
Distraction 15.00 (6.25) 
Re-appraisal 
Punishment 
12.00 (6.25) 
10.00 (4.50) 
Worry 8.00 (4.50) 
Social Control 7.00 (6.75) 
 
 
3.5 Pre- and Post-experimental Appraisal Ratings of Target Intrusion 
Appraisal ratings were analysed to examine whether the experimental manipulations had 
any effect on the interpretation of target intrusions. Scores were analysed using mixed 2 
(Group: Suppression, Cognitive Defusion) by 2 (Time: Pre-experimental, Post-
experimental) repeated measures ANOVAs. Square root transformations were applied to 
the scores for questions concerning guilt and harm. Descriptive statistics for appraisals are 
presented in Table 5.  
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Table 5 
Appraisal Ratings of Intrusive Thoughts 
 
Appraisal Ratings (0-100) Suppression 
Median (IQR) 
Cognitive Defusion 
Median (IQR) 
Pre-experimental    
Unpleasant 70.50 (32.50) 65.00 (46.50) 
Guilty 
Unacceptable 
Suppression 
Harm 
Responsible 
Worry  
Eliminate 
43.00 (35.75) 
53.50 (60.75) 
65.00 (37.75) 
26.00( 53.50) 
59.00 (78.25) 
62.50 (28.25) 
71.50 (35.25) 
55.00 (55.50) 
41.00 (73.50) 
75.00 (35.50) 
53.00 (74.00) 
64.00 (83.00 ) 
72.00 (42.50) 
69.00 (35.00) 
 
Post-experimental 
  
 
Unpleasant 62.00 (31.00) 47.00 (50.75) 
Guilty 
Unacceptable 
Suppression 
Harm 
Responsible 
Worry  
Eliminate 
30.00 (47.00) 
52.00 (59.00) 
59.00 (59.00) 
14.00 (58.50) 
38.00 (70.00) 
51.00 (31.00) 
35.00 (36.00) 
24.50 (56.50) 
47.50 (70.00) 
61.50 (23.75) 
59.50 (63.25) 
42.50 (59.50) 
44.50 (57.75) 
50.00 (40.50) 
 
There was a significant main effect of time for five of the eight appraisal ratings. These 
results were as follows: worry[F(1,45)=16.82, p<.001, partial η2=0.27]; 
eliminate[F(1,45)=28.76, p<.001, partial η2=0.39]; responsibility[F(1,45)=5.36, p<.05, 
partial η2=0.11]; guilt[F(1,45)=18.11, p<.001, partial η2=0.29]; suppression[F(1,45)=6.09, 
p<.05, partial η2=0.12]. Post-experimental scores for the appraisal question concerning 
suppression violated the assumption of homogeneity of variance. It should be noted, 
however, that sample sizes were substantial and almost identical in the suppression and 
cognitive defusion groups (n=23, n=24, respectively). For all eight appraisal ratings, there 
were no significant main effects for group or interaction effects (ps>.05). 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Findings 
This study examined the effects of thought suppression and cognitive defusion on the 
occurrence of obsessional intrusive thoughts and associated distress and believability. It 
was hypothesised that suppression would increase intrusive thought frequency both during 
suppression (immediate enhancement) and in the subsequent monitoring phase (rebound 
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effect) relative to baseline. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that these increases would be 
associated with increased distress. The hypotheses regarding increased thought frequency 
were based on the so-called ―white bear‖ effect. However, the findings of this study did not 
support these hypotheses. No increase in thought frequency was detected in the 
suppression or post-suppression phases. In fact, a decrease in intrusive thought frequency 
was observed in the post-suppression phase relative to the baseline phase. Furthermore, no 
significant changes in distress were detected over the course of the experimental week. In 
sum, there was no evidence for immediate enhancement or rebound effects, contrary to 
findings from some previous studies (e.g. Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Salkovskis & 
Campbell, 1994; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Nevertheless, the lack of 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects is consistent with findings from a similar 
naturalistic study of obsessional thoughts (Ralston, 2011). 
 
When participants in the suppression group were asked to indicate how often they used 
various thought control techniques during the suppression phase, they rated distraction as 
their most frequently used strategy. There is reason to believe that participants‘ use of 
distraction during suppression may have contributed to these null findings. Wegner, 
Schneider, Carter, and White (1987) conducted a ―white bear‖ experiment, in which one 
group was instructed to use focused distraction during thought suppression (i.e. ―If you do 
happen to think of a white bear, please try to think of a red Volkswagen instead‖). The 
rebound effect was reliably reduced in this group compared to a group not using focused 
distraction during suppression. Furthermore, Lavy and van den Hout (1990), who found 
evidence for an immediate enhancement effect during suppression, pointed out that the 
results of pilot studies showed that it was necessary to add to the suppression instructions 
that participants should not use deliberate distraction techniques. Therefore, it is unclear if 
they would have been able to show this effect if distraction had been allowed. The results 
of a study by Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) also suggested that distraction could play an 
important role in moderating the effects of thought suppression. They found an immediate 
enhancement effect for participants instructed to suppress their intrusive thoughts and 
participants instructed to suppress their thoughts by distracting themselves (without 
specifying this further). However, there was no enhancement effect for participants 
provided with a specific distraction task to perform at the same time as suppressing their 
thoughts. The above results suggest that it is possible that participants‘ use of some type of 
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focussed distraction in the naturalistic setting of the current study explains the lack of 
immediate enhancement or rebound effects.  
 
In relation to cognitive defusion, it was hypothesised that defusing from intrusive thoughts 
would not result in any change in intrusive thought frequency. This was indeed found to be 
the case. However, there was an unexpected decrease in intrusive thought frequency in 
phase 3 compared to phase 1. It was also hypothesised that cognitive defusion would 
decrease distress during the defusion phase relative to baseline. In addition, the effect of 
cognitive defusion on believability was explored. Cognitive defusion has previously been 
shown to produce superior results to distraction (Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan, 
2010; Masuda, et al., 2010) and imaginal exposure (Watson, Burley, & Purdon, 2010), and 
similar results to other active treatment conditions, namely cognitive restructuring 
(Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011) and suppression (Pilecki & McKay, 
2012) in reducing distress and believability of negative thoughts. In the present study 
though, there was no change in distress or believability for the cognitive defusion group.  
 
From an ACT perspective, the aim of defusion is not to control or get rid of unwanted 
thoughts or reduce the painful feelings associated with them. The aim of defusion is to 
reduce the influence of unhelpful thoughts/feelings upon behaviour. Mindful, values-
congruent living is the desired outcome in ACT, not symptom reduction. So, although 
ACT typically reduces symptoms, this is not the goal (Harris, 2009). Therefore, the 
findings that thought frequency and distress remained unchanged during the cognitive 
defusion phase are not inconsistent with the ACT conceptual framework.  
 
Similarly, reducing believability is not considered to be an important goal in ACT. Fusion 
is not the same as believability. One can defuse from a thought that is believable. For 
example, if someone were suffering from a terminal illness, there would be a time and 
place when it would be useful to think about dying (i.e. writing a will, making medical care 
arrangements). However, there are other times when it would be useful to defuse from 
these thoughts and allow them to come and go, without getting caught up in them (e.g. if 
they were stopping that person from pursuing a valued activity). When individuals defuse 
from thoughts, they often do reduce in believability. However, from an ACT perspective, 
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this is not important (Harris, 2009). Therefore, the finding that believability did not change 
in the current study is again consistent with the purpose of defusion within ACT. It  should 
also be noted that the cognitive defusion instructions employed specifically stated that 
participants should not focus on whether their target thought was true or false but on 
whether it would help them create a richer, fuller, and more meaningful life if they let it 
guide their behaviour. This contrasts with the cognitive defusion instructions of previous 
studies that showed a reduction in believability (i.e. Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-
Taylor, 2011; Masuda, Feinstein, Wendell, & Sheehan, 2010; Masuda, et al., 2010). These 
studies emphasized a reduction in the literality and meaning of thoughts rather than 
reducing their impact on behaviour. This could help explain the difference in findings.  
 
This study showed that both suppression and cognitive defusion groups experienced 
reductions in the following negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts from pre- to post-
experiment: worry about acting on the thought or that it might otherwise happen in real 
life; difficulty eliminating the thought; feeling of responsibility for harm occurring to 
oneself or others upon having the thought; feeling guilty when the thought enters one‘s 
head; and importance of suppressing the thought. It is interesting, in this regard, that re-
appraisal was rated as the second most frequently used thought control technique by 
participants, when they were instructed to suppress their target thoughts.  
 
Cognitive theories of OCD highlight the importance of appraisals of intrusive thoughts. 
For example, Rachman (1997) proposed that obsessions were caused by catastrophic 
misinterpretations of the significance of one‘s thoughts. A relationship has also been 
identified between OCD and a cognitive bias called thought-action fusion (Rachman, 
1993). This bias can take one of two forms – the belief that having the thought may 
actually influence the probability that the aversive event will occur and the belief that 
having a repugnant unacceptable thought is morally equivalent to carrying out the relevant 
action. Similarly, Salkovskis (1999) proposed that the key to understanding obsessional 
problems lies in the way in which intrusive thoughts are interpreted. Furthermore, the 
important negative interpretations usually concern the idea that the person‘s action (or 
choice not to act) could result in harm to oneself or others. This responsibility 
interpretation has several consequences, namely motivating neutralising behaviour and 
other counterproductive strategies, such as increasing selective attention, and increased 
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negative mood. These strategies serve to maintain the negative beliefs and therefore the 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour. Cognitive behavioural interventions for OCD have arisen 
from cognitive theories of OCD. A particularly important element in these interventions 
involves encouraging patients to construct alternative interpretations of their intrusive 
thoughts and to match the available evidence for and against the original catastrophic 
significance and these alternatives. This may include behavioural experiments designed to 
collect new evidence that permits tests of the different interpretations. Most therapy 
techniques focus on reappraisal and a key component of this is normalising the 
significance of the occurrence and content of intrusions. Accordingly, the current findings 
pertaining to post-experimental improvements in negative appraisals are promising. 
Furthermore, it is possible that these changes may have contributed to the reduction in the 
frequency of intrusive thoughts in the final phase of the experiment. However, it is unclear 
when the changes in appraisals took place, as appraisal measurements were only taken 
before and after the experiment. Therefore, it is impossible to tell if they occurred prior to 
the final phase of the experiment.  
 
As discussed above, suppression and cognitive defusion appeared to have similar 
beneficial effects, at least in the short term, in relation to the frequency of intrusive 
thoughts and their appraisal. However, one advantage of cognitive defusion was identified, 
namely that cognitive defusion instructions were rated as being easier to follow.   
 
4.2 Strengths and Limitations 
The sample was restricted to non-clinical university students. Although participants were 
screened for obsessional intrusions and participants scored within clinical ranges on self-
report measures of OCD, they were not seeking help in relation to their intrusions. This 
could limit the generalisability of the results. However, there is some evidence to suggest 
that this might not necessarily be the case. Magee, Harden, and Teachman (2012), in their 
meta-analytic review of thought suppression, examined the difficulty of thought 
suppression according to the presence or absence of psychopathology. Results indicated 
that during the immediate enhancement thinking period, difficulty with thought 
suppression attempts was similar between psychopathological and non-clinical samples. 
There was also little difference between these samples for the rebound thinking period. 
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This suggests that thought suppression is associated with similar recurrence of thoughts 
(compared to control instructions) in samples with and without psychopathology.   
 
One of the strengths of this study is that it was conducted over a 6-day period. As 
mentioned previously, much of the thought suppression literature is based on studies 
conducted in laboratories lasting only minutes. However, it would also be interesting to 
explore what the longer-term effects of these interventions might have been. In particular, 
it would be worth examining whether the benefits witnessed lasted over time. 
 
One of the drawbacks of conducting a naturalistic study is that it is impossible to control 
for situational factors that may have contributed to thought occurrences. However, it was 
decided to conduct such a study in an effort to counteract the general lack of ecological 
validity in previously published research due to a reliance on laboratory-based studies. 
 
Similar to the majority of other studies in this area, the study did not control for the effects 
of social desirability on ratings of thought occurrences. This has particular relevance for 
the suppression group who may have reduced reporting of intrusive thoughts in line with 
instructions to suppress these thoughts. However, the fact that participants only reported a 
reduction in thought frequency in the final phase of the study and not in the suppression 
phase suggests that social desirability was not especially prominent.  
 
Another limitation of the current study is the lack of a control group. Use of an inert 
control group that controlled for non-specific features of the other two interventions would 
have allowed one to rule out more easily any placebo or social desirability effects or 
regression to the mean in accounting for the reduction in thought frequency over time. 
However, interestingly, there were only improvements on a limited number of measures in 
this study, which suggests that these factors may not have been overly important in the 
study.   
 
Finally, in relation to cognitive defusion, it is believed that a measure of the impact of this 
technique on behaviour would have provided a more appropriate measure of its 
effectiveness. This represents a limitation to the findings of the study, given the emphasis 
in the cognitive defusion instructions on the link between target intrusive thoughts and 
behaviour. Considering that obsessional thoughts are associated with neutralising 
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compulsive behaviours, it is recommended that future studies using cognitive defusion 
with these thoughts examine if defusion has any impact on the performance of 
compulsions.  
 
4.3 Implications 
It has become customary to think of thought suppression as a unitary phenomenon. 
However, there is a large literature on the various avoidance and escape-oriented strategies 
people may resort to when confronted with intrusive cognitions. These strategies have been 
labelled blunting, distraction, and retrieval inhibition amongst others. According to Rassin, 
Merckelbach, and Muris (2000), the thought suppression research domain would benefit 
from a refined classification of avoidant strategies. They also point out that it is highly 
unlikely that all these strategies have counterproductive effects that contribute to 
psychopathology. This hypothesis could help explain the failure to find an immediate 
enhancement or rebound effect for suppression in the current study. The suppression group 
in the current study rated distraction and reappraisal as the two most frequently used 
thought control strategies, when they were asked to suppress their intrusive thoughts. 
Research discussed above suggests that both of these strategies have adaptive qualities. 
Consequently, it is proposed that rather than ‗banning thought suppression‘ as a whole in 
therapy, it appears important for research to identify maladaptive suppression techniques 
that should be banned.  
 
Nonetheless, the Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987) thought suppression 
paradigm has significantly influenced theoretical models of psychological disorder and 
subsequent treatment techniques that discourage the use of thought suppression. 
Salkovskis, Forrester, and Richards (1998) cited thought suppression as a 
counterproductive ―safety strategy‖ and maintaining factor in their cognitive model of 
obsessional problems. In addition, Rachman (1998) referred to Wegner‘s ―white bear‖ 
effect in another cognitive theory of obsessions. According to this model, an inflated 
increase in the significance attached to an unwanted obsessional thought will lead to 
vigorous attempts to suppress such thoughts. These attempts can then produce an increase 
in the frequency of the obsession. Furthermore, these paradoxical increases may actually 
strengthen the catastrophic misinterpretations themselves and a vicious cycle is 
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established. The inclusion of a demonstration of the paradoxical effects of thought 
suppression in CBT treatment manuals of OCD also suggests an apparent consensus 
regarding the harmful effects of thought suppression (Smari, 2001).  
 
However, McLean (2006), in his systematic review of experimental studies examining the 
effects of thought suppression in OCD, concluded that the studies offered little weight to 
support the citation of thought suppression in conceptualisations of obsessional problems. 
He also pointed out that the existing literature was lacking in many respects and urged 
researchers to move away from the laboratory-based approach and conduct studies over 
longer time periods and within participants‘ everyday environment, using clinical samples 
or participants experiencing high levels of obsessive symptomatology. All of these 
methodical issues were addressed in the current study. Nonetheless, there was still no 
evidence for the ―white bear‖ effect. Indeed, the findings of this study suggest that 
suppression may have some beneficial effects, at least in the short-term. Therefore, this 
study adds to previous evidence to show that the effects of thought suppression are far 
from clear-cut. This suggests that, in terms of treatment, a reduced focus on the harmful 
effects of suppression may be warranted.   
 
The findings in relation to cognitive defusion and distress and believability were not as 
positive as previous studies examining these outcomes for contamination-related thoughts 
and negative self-referential thoughts. However, it is argued that the outcome measures in 
this study were not wholly appropriate considering the aim of cognitive defusion in ACT. 
It is recommended that future research examine more functional effects of cognitive 
defusion and how it might affect compulsive behaviour. Nonetheless, there were some 
positive effects associated with cognitive defusion that were similar to the positive effects 
of suppression. Furthermore, cognitive defusion was superior to suppression in one respect, 
namely it was easier to follow the cognitive defusion instructions. Given the positive 
findings of the current study and the limited number of other studies looking at the use of 
cognitive defusion with obsessional intrusive thoughts, it is recommended that further 
research be conducted in this area. Such research might explore cognitive defusion‘s 
potential for helping individuals with OCD learn to relate to their intrusive obsessions in a 
way that does not significantly interfere with their normal routine, occupational (or 
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academic) functioning, or usual social activities or relationships, one of the diagnostic 
criteria for OCD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
This study has demonstrated that thought suppression did not lead to a paradoxical increase 
in thought frequency in a highly obsessional sample over a period of six days. 
Furthermore, there were some positive effects associated with thought suppression. These 
findings contribute to a body of literature which has failed to find paradoxical detrimental 
effects associated with thought suppression in OCD. This has implications for the 
refinement of thought control strategies used during suppression and the theoretical models 
and treatments of OCD that highlight the harmful effects of suppression.  
 
In relation to cognitive defusion, it was proposed that the outcome measures in this study 
were not wholly appropriate considering the aim of cognitive defusion. It was 
recommended that future research examine the more functional effects of cognitive 
defusion and how it might relate to compulsive behaviour. Despite this, there were positive 
findings for cognitive defusion in relation to the frequency and appraisals of intrusive 
thoughts. These findings suggest that further research in this area is warranted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
References 
Abramowitz, J. S., Tolin, D. F., & Street, G. P. (2001). Paradoxical effects of thought 
suppression: A meta-analysis of controlled studies. Clinical Psychology Review, 21, 683-
703.  
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (4
th
 ed., text revision). Washington, DC: Author. 
Bjelland I., Dahl, A. A., Haug, T. T., & Neckelmann, D. (2002). The validity of the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; an updated review. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 52:69-77. 
Bond, F. W., Hayes, S. C., Baer, R. A., Carpenter, K. C., Guenole, N., Orcutt, H. K., 
Waltz, T. & Zettle, R. D. (2011). Preliminary psychometric properties of the Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire – II: A revised measure of psychological flexibility and 
acceptance. Behavior Therapy, 42, 676-688. 
Clark, D. A. (2005). Intrusive thoughts in clinical disorders: Theory, research, and 
treatment. New York: Guilford Press.  
Clark, D. A., & Beck, A. T. (2002). Manual for the Clark–Beck Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory. San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
Cohen, J. (1977). Statistical power analysis for the behavioural sciences (revised ed.). 
New York: Academic Press. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioural sciences (2
nd
 ed.). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
Deacon, B. J., Fawzy, T. I., Lickel, J. J., Wolitzky-Taylor, K. B. (2011). Cognitive 
defusion versus cognitive restructuring in the treatment of negative self-referential 
thoughts: An investigation of process and outcome. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 
25(3), pp. 218-232. 
Erdfelder E., Faul F., & Buchner A. (1996). GPOWER: A general power analysis program. 
Behaviour Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 28, 1-11.  
Field, A. (2009). Discovering Statistics Using SPSS. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
 
63 
 
Foa, E. B., Huppert, J. D., Leiberg, S., Langner, R., Kichic, R., Hajcak, G., et al. (2002). 
The Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory:  development and validation of a short version. 
Psychological Assessment, 14, 485–496. 
Foa, E. B., Kozak, M. J., Salkovskis, P., Coles, M. E., & Amir, N. (1998). The validation 
of a new obsessive–compulsive disorder scale: the Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory. 
Psychological Assessment, 10, 206–214. 
Harris, R. (2009). ACT made simple. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, Inc. 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K., Wilson, K. G., Bisset, R. J., Pistorello, J., et al. (2004). 
Experiential avoidance: a preliminary test of a working model. The Psychological Record, 
54, 553-578.  
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and commitment 
therapy: an experiential approach to behavior change. New York: Guilford Press.  
Healy, H. A., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Keogh, C. (2008). An 
experimental test of a cognitive defusion exercise: Coping with negative and positive self-
statements. The Psychological Record, 58, 623-640.  
Lavy, E. H., & van den Hout, M. A. (1990). Thought suppression induces intrusions. 
Behavioural Psychotherapy, 18, 251-258. 
Magee, J. C., Harden, P. K., & Teachman, B. A. (2012). Psychopathology and thought 
suppression: A quantitative review. Clinical Psychology Review, 32 189-201.  
Marcks, B. A., & Woods, D. W. (2005). A comparison of thought suppression to an 
acceptance-based technique in the management of personal intrusive thoughts: a controlled 
evaluation. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 433–445. 
Masuda, A., Hayes, S. C., Sackett, C. F., & Twohig, M. P. (2004). Cognitive defusion and 
self-relevant negative thoughts: examining the impact of a ninety year old technique. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 477-485. 
Masuda, A., Hayes, S. C., Twohig, M. P., Drossel, C., Lillis, J., & Washio, Y. (2009). A 
Parametric Study of Cognitive Defusion and the Believability and Discomfort of Negative 
Self-Relevant Thoughts. Behavior Modification, 33, 2, 250-262.  
Masuda, A., Feinstein, A. B. Wendell, J. W. & Sheehan, S. T. (2010). Cognitive defusion 
versus thought distraction: A clinical rationale, training, and experiential exercise in 
64 
 
altering psychological impacts of negative self-referential thoughts. Behavior Modification, 
34 (6), pp. 520-538. 
Masuda, A., Twohig, M. P., Stormo, A. R., Feinstein, A. B., Chou, Ying-Yi, & Wendell, 
J.W. (2010). The effects of cognitive defusion and thought distraction on emotional 
discomfort and believability of negative self-referential thoughts. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 41(1), pp. 11-17. 
McLean, A. (2006). Are the effects of thought suppression so clear cut?: a systematic 
review of the experimental literature for obsessive compulsive disorder. In A. McLean, 
How do thought suppression attempts impact upon beliefs about uncontrollability of 
worry? (pp. 26-93) (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Glasgow, Scotland.  
McLean, A., & Broomfield, N. (2007). How does thought suppression impact upon beliefs 
about uncontrollability of worry? Behaviour Research Therapy, 45, 2938-2949. 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (2005). Psychometric validation of the 
Obsessive Beliefs questionnaire and the interpretations of intrusions inventory—Part 2: 
factor analyses and testing of a brief version. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 1527–
1542. 
Pilecki, B. C., & McKay, D. (2012). An experimental investigation of cognitive defusion. 
The Psychological Record, 62 (1), 19-40. 
Purdon, C. (2004). Empirical investigations of thought suppression in OCD. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 35, 121-136.  
Purdon, C. & Clark, D. A. (1994). Obsessive intrusive thoughts in nonclinical subjects II: 
cognitive appraisal, emotional response and thought control strategies, Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 32, 403–410. 
Rachman, S. (1993). Obsessions, responsibility, and guilt. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 31, 149-154. 
Rachman, S. (1997). A Cognitive theory of obsessions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
35, 793-802. 
Rachman, S. (1998). A cognitive theory of obsessions: Elaborations. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 36, 385–401. 
65 
 
Rachman, S. & Hodgson, R. J. (Eds.) (1980). Obsessions and Compulsions. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
Ralston, S. (2011). The Impact of Thought Suppression Outside the Laboratory: Effects on 
Thought Frequency, Dismissability and Distress in an Obsessional Cohort (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). University of Glasgow, Scotland.   
Rassin, E., Merckelbach, H, & Muris, P. (2000). Paradoxical and less Paradoxical Effects 
of Thought Suppression: a Critical Review. Clinical Psychology Review, 20, 8, 973-995.  
Salkovskis, P. M. (1985). Obsessional-compulsive problems: A cognitive-behavioural 
analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 571-584.  
Salkovskis, P. M. (1989). Cognitive-behavioural factors and the persistence of intrusive 
thoughts in obsessional problems. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27, 677-682.  
Salkovskis, P. M. (1998). Psychological approaches to the understanding of obsessional 
problems. In R. P. Swinson, M. M. Antony, S. Rachman, & M. A. Richter (Eds.), 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder: Theory, research and treatment (pp. 33–50). New York: 
Guilford. 
Salkovskis, P. M. (1999). Understanding and treating obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, S29-52.  
Salkovskis, P. M. & Campbell, P. (1994). Thought suppression induces intrusion in 
naturally occurring negative intrusive thoughts. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32 (1), 
1-8.  
Salkovskis, P. M, Richards, H. C., & Forrester, E. (1995). The relationship between 
obsessional problems and intrusive thoughts. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 
23, 281-299.  
Salkovskis, P. M., Forrester, E., & Richards, C. (1998). Cognitive Behavioural approach to 
understanding obsessional thinking. British Journal of Psychiatry, 173 (Suppl. 35), 53-63. 
Salkovskis, P. M., Wroe, A. L., Gledhill, A., Morrison, N., Forrester, E., Richards, C., 
Reynolds, M., & Thorp, S. (2000). Responsibility attitudes and interpretations 
characteristic of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 
347–372. 
66 
 
Smari, J. (2001). Fifteen Years of Suppression of White Bears and Other Thoughts: What 
are the Lessons for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Research and Treatment? 
Scandinavian Journal of Behaviour Therapy, 30 (4), 147-160.  
Titchener, E. B. (1916). A text-book of psychology. New York: MacMillan. 
Watson, C., Burley, M. C., & Purdon, C. (2010). Verbal repetition in the reappraisal of 
contamination-related thoughts, Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 38 (3), 337-
353. 
Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R., & White, T. L. (1987). Paradoxical Effects 
of Thought Suppression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53 (1), 5-13. 
Wells, A., & Davies, M. I. (1994). The thought control questionnaire: a measure of 
individual differences in the control of unwanted thoughts. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 32, 871–878. 
Zigmond, A. S., & Snaith, R. P. (1983). "The hospital anxiety and depression scale". Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 67 (6), 361–370. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: ADVANCED CLINICAL PRACTICE I - 
REFLECTIVE ACCOUNT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflections on my use of time management -“A man who dares to waste 
one hour of life has not discovered the value of life” (Charles Darwin) 
 
 
Bernadette O’ Sullivan¹ 
 
 
 
 
¹ Academic Unit of Mental Health and Wellbeing, Institute of Health and Wellbeing, 
University of Glasgow  
 
 
Correspondence Address: 
 
Mental Health & Wellbeing 
Academic Centre 
Gartnavel Royal Hospital 
1055 Great Western Road 
Glasgow 
G12 0XH 
E-mail: bosullivan9@yahoo.co.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
Abstract 
 
I have chosen in my reflective account to reflect on an experience I had during course 12 
of my training in relation to carrying out my clinical duties. I employed Gibbs‘ (1988) 
model of reflection to guide my reflections. I chose a neuropsychology placement as one of 
my specialist third year placements. The combination of a high caseload and my lack of 
experience working in this area made this a very challenging experience for me. I found 
that I was struggling to keep up with my caseload and this was causing me to feel stressed 
and somewhat inadequate in my role as a trainee. However, I was able to speak to my 
supervisor about how I was feeling and he was understanding of my position when he took 
into account the steep learning curve I faced on this placement. I also had to take into 
consideration my time management and how this was affecting my performance. 
Fortunately, following personal reflection and consultation with others, I managed to learn 
some valuable time management skills and instead of just working harder, I was now able 
to work in a smarter way. I have long been aware that my time management skills were a 
particular weakness of mine and I think this is related to my perfectionistic tendencies. 
Therefore, it came as a welcome relief to me on this placement when I finally learned some 
skills that allowed me to address this weakness. As a result, I can now work more 
productively, which will allow me to make time to give to all the valued areas of my life 
and maintain an important work-life balance. In my account, I have also reflected on the 
necessity arising from the ―Improving Access to Psychological Therapies‖ HEAT target 
for all clinical psychologists to be able to work in a highly efficient way to ensure this 
target is met. Finally, I reflected on how working in an unfamiliar specialist area impacted 
upon the level at which I was functioning within the Integrated Development Model 
(Stoltenberg, McNeill, & Delworth, 1998). 
 
.    
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Abstract 
 
I have chosen in my reflective account to reflect on my experiences of leading on a service 
development project on a neuropsychology specialist placement, which involved 
developing a cognitive screening tool and training non-psychology staff in the use of this 
tool as well as on legislation relevant to this project. I employed Gibbs‘ (1988) model of 
reflection to guide my reflections on this experience. I have considered the role of a 
clinical psychologist providing training in psychological skills/knowledge within the 
context of increased public demand for psychological services, the new Health Efficiency 
Access and Treatment (HEAT) target on improving access to psychological services, and 
the matched/stepped care model of service delivery. I reflected on my initial anxiety when 
faced with this task, which was mainly concerned with my under-estimation of the skills I 
had gained throughout training that enabled me to successfully manage this task. This was 
a valuable learning experience for me during training and has increased my confidence in 
my ability to share my psychological knowledge with others and make a valuable 
contribution to a multidisciplinary team service development. My ability to lead on this 
project marked for me the progress I had made in my training. In the first year of training, 
much of my focus was on learning therapeutic skills and learning about psychological 
models. I was then able to develop and consolidate these therapeutic skills in second year.  
In the final year of my training, I was given the opportunity to become involved in the 
other roles of a clinical psychologist, namely service development and staff training. This 
was a positive experience for me and has increased my confidence in doing this type of 
work in the future. Writing this reflective account has allowed me to reflect on how my 
psychological skills have developed over the course of my training. I very much value the 
training I have received over the past three years and am looking forward to obtaining my 
first position as a qualified clinical psychologist and using the skills I have learned to work 
as an effective reflective scientist practitioner.  
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Appendix 1.1 Submission Guidelines 
 
Submission Guidelines for Behaviour Research and Therapy.  Full details can be accessed at:   
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/265?generatepdf=true 
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Appendix 1.2: Quality Rating Tool 
 
Scoring                                                                   Items 
 
 Sample  
 
0-3 
 
 
0 or 3 
1. Is the sample a convenience sample, e.g. clinic attenders, referred clients 
(score 2) or a geographic cohort, e.g. all clients eligible in a particular area 
(score 3) or a highly selective sample, e.g. volunteers (score 0) 
2. Is the sample size greater than 27 participants in each treatment group 
(score 3) or based on described and adequate power calculations (score 3)? 
 Control conditions 
 
0-3 3. Non-active control condition (score 2) or control condition that controls for 
non-specific effects or other established or credible intervention (score 3) or 
no control condition (score 0) 
 Interventions 
 
0-3 
0-3 
0-3 
4. Are the interventions of interest clearly described?  
5. Are the experimenters clearly described? (i.e. qualifications, experience etc.) 
6. Is compliance with the intervention adequate? Score 0 if this was not 
assessed. 
 Allocation 
 
0 or 3 
0 or 3 
0 or 3 
7. Is there random allocation or minimisation allocation to groups? 
8.  Is the process of randomisation/minimisation described?  
9. Are the participants in different intervention groups? 
 Assessment 
 
0 or 3 
 
10. Are standardised assessment measures used to assess distress and 
believability (score 3) or idiosyncratic measures (score 0) 
 Analysis 
 
0-3 
 
 
0 or 3 
0- 3 
0 or 3 
11. Baseline characteristics of alternative treatment groups and control groups 
(if included) were adequately compared (e.g. demographic factors, mental 
health) 
12. Is the analysis appropriate to the design and type of outcome measure?  
13 Is there adequate adjustment for confounding in the analyses? 
14 Are effect sizes reported? 
Scoring guide 0-3: Well covered (3), Adequately addressed (2), Poorly addressed (1), Not addressed, not 
reported (0). Unless otherwise specified. Scoring guide 0 or 3: Yes (3), No or not reported (0). Scoring 
calculation: Scores for applicable items are summed and divided by the maximum score possible for the 
number of applicable items. This number is multiplied by 100 to give a % score.  
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Appendix 1.3: Study Scoring Sheet 
 
Study Deacon 
et al. 
(2011) 
De 
Young 
et al. 
(2010) 
Healy 
et al. 
(2008) 
Masuda 
et al. 
(2004) 
Masuda 
et al. 
(2009) 
Exp. 1 
Masuda 
et al. 
(2009) 
Exp. 2 
Masuda et 
al. (2009) 
Exp.s 1+2 
Masuda, 
Feinstein 
et al. 
(2010) 
Masuda, 
Feinstein 
et al. 
(2010)/ 
Sub-
group 
Masuda, 
et al. 
(2010) 
Masuda, 
et al. 
(2010) 
Sub-
group 
Pilecki 
& 
McKay 
(2012) 
Watson 
et al. 
(2010)  
Study 1 
Watson 
et al. 
(2010) 
Study 2 
Item 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Item 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 3 
Item 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Item 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Item 5 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 
Item 6 2 3 3 0 3 3 3 0 0 2 2 2 0 1 
Item 7 3 3 3 NA 3 3 NA 3 NA 3 NA 3 3 3 
Item 8 0 0 0 NA 0 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 0 0 
Item 9 3 3 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Item 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
Item 11 3 0 2 NA 0 0 0 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 
Item 12 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Item 13 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 
Item 14 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 
Total 22 24 22 10 21 21 18 27 22 32 24 27 22 25 
% score 52 57 52 30 50 50 50 64 61 76 67 64 52 60 
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Appendix 2.1: Letter of Ethical Approval 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear BERNADETTE O’SULLIVAN 
 
MVLS College Ethics Committee 
 
Project Title:  Comparing the effectiveness of thought suppression and a cognitive 
defusion technique in managing obsessional intrusive thoughts 
Project No:  2012076 
 
The College Ethics Committee has reviewed your application and has agreed that there is 
no objection on ethical grounds to the proposed study.  They are happy therefore to 
approve the project, subject to the following conditions 
 The research should be carried out only on the sites, and/or with the groups defined in 
the application. 
 Any proposed changes in the protocol should be submitted for reassessment, except 
when it is necessary to change the protocol to eliminate hazard to the subjects or 
where the change involves only the administrative aspects of the project.  The Ethics 
Committee should be informed of any such changes. 
 If the study does not start within three years of the date of this letter, the project should 
be resubmitted. 
 You should submit a short end of study report to the Ethics Committee within 3 months 
of completion. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Dr Dorothy McKeegan 
College Ethics Officer  
  
Dr Dorothy McKeegan 
  
Senior Lecturer 
 R303 Level 3 
Institute of Biodiversity Animal Health and Comparative Medicine 
Jarrett Building 
Glasgow G61 1QH Tel: 0141 330 5712 
E-mail: Dorothy.McKeegan@glasgow.ac.uk 
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Appendix 2.2: Email advertisement for Recruitment Purposes 
 
Would you like to take part in a research study about repetitive 
unwanted and unpleasant thoughts? 
 
 
 
We can all experience these types of thoughts, especially when under stress, for 
example during exams times.   
  
This study is interested in finding out how people cope with these thoughts in a student population 
to help develop our understanding and treatment of mental health problems. I am looking for 
people who experience any type of unwanted thoughts. It doesn‘t matter what these thoughts are 
about, as there is a wide variety but here are some common examples: 
  
o       thoughts that you left an appliance on that might cause a fire 
o       image of a loved one having an accident 
o       the thought that objects are not arranged perfectly 
o       a thought or image that is contrary to your religious or moral beliefs 
o       an impulse to say something rude or embarrassing 
o       the thought of running your car off the road or into oncoming traffic 
o       the thought that you didn‘t lock the door and someone may break in 
  
Don‘t worry if you are not sure whether you are suitable. The first part of the study involves filling 
out a short questionnaire to help us decide whether you are eligible to participate. After completing 
the questionnaire and if you meet our entry criteria, we will invite you to participate in the second 
part of the study which involves two short meetings with our researcher, one week apart and will 
involve monitoring your thoughts in between these meetings. If you decide to take part, you are 
free to withdraw from the study at any time. 
  
If you are interested, please click on this link:  
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/VK32FYG 
to fill out a 5 minute questionnaire and to find out further information on the study.  
 
Thank you in advance for any help you can provide with this research study. I am a postgraduate 
student and your input will help towards completion of my doctoral qualification and will provide 
much needed information to advance psychological treatments.  
  
 
Bernadette O‘ Sullivan (BA, HDip Psych, MA, PhD)    
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Institute of Health and Wellbeing       
College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences 
University of Glasgow      
1st Floor, Administration Building        
Gartnavel Royal Hospital 
1055 Great Western Road     
Glasgow G12 0XH      
Email: glasgowthoughtstudy2@gmail.com  
Research supervised by Professor Kate Davidson 
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Appendix 2.3 Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Study Title:  An Investigation into Ways of Managing Unwanted Intrusive Thoughts 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before deciding whether you wish to 
participate, it is important to read the following information so that you understand why the research 
is being carried out and what your participation would involve. Please take the time to read the 
information carefully and consider whether you wish to take part. 
 
 
What is the study about? 
 
The study is about ‘intrusive thoughts’.  An ‘intrusive thought’ is the name given to unpleasant or 
unwanted thoughts or images that pop into your mind unexpectedly. Nearly everyone has intrusive 
thoughts. This study wants to find out more about different ways individuals can respond to these 
thoughts. 
 
 
Why have I been asked to take part? 
 
This study is looking at intrusive thoughts in a non-clinical population. It is hoped that this will 
improve our understanding of the experience of intrusive thoughts in clinical populations with 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. This may lead to ideas for both research and for improvements in 
clinical practice with people who seek help from mental health services because of their intrusive 
thoughts. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Taking part in this study is entirely voluntary.  If you do decide to take part, you will be asked to 
keep this information sheet and to sign a consent form.  You will receive a copy of your signed 
consent form.  If you decide to take part you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, 
without having to provide any explanation and without consequence.  Any information collected 
from you would then be destroyed. 
 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
 
There are 2 parts to this study. 
 
Stage 1:  You will be asked to fill out an electronic questionnaire about your intrusive thoughts 
through a link to the website surveymonkey.com. This questionnaire will take about 5-10 minutes to 
complete.   
 
Stage 2:  Participation in stage 2 will involve two short, individual sessions with the researcher at a 
time of your convenience.  Meetings will take place at the Public Health Department, University of 
Glasgow Campus,1 Lilybank Gardens. Each of these sessions will last approximately 30 minutes 
and there will be a period of one week between them. At the first session you will be asked to 
identify one of your intrusive thoughts and asked to provide some ratings about it.  During the week 
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you will be asked to keep a record of how often you experienced your identified thought.  This 
should take no more than a few minutes each day.  In the second session, you will be asked to 
provide some more ratings about your chosen thought. 
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risk of taking part? 
 
There are no known risks of taking part in a study of this sort. This type of study has been used by 
many researchers and is commonly completed with help from student volunteers. The study will 
take up a small amount of your time and you may find it slightly uncomfortable to monitor unwanted 
thoughts. However, we do not predict that that you will experience any harmful effects. If you do 
find any aspect of the study unpleasant then you should let the researcher know. Additionally, you 
can contact Dr Susan Ralston, Clinical Psychologist, Department of Clinical Psychology, 
Leverndale Hospital, G53 7TU, Tel: 0141 2116629. She can direct you to further sources of 
support, if necessary. It is stressed that your participation is voluntary and that you are free to 
withdraw at any time. 
 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
There are no direct benefits for you.  However, it is hoped that this research will generate ideas for 
future research and lead to improvement in treatments for intrusive thoughts in clinical populations.   
 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes.  All information will be kept strictly confidential in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
1998. You will be identified by an ID number and any information about you will have your name 
and address removed so that you cannot be recognised from it. Your data will be stored securely in 
a locked filing cabinet.  Electronic data will be stored on an encrypted password-protected laptop 
from the University of Glasgow. At the end of the study, this data will be transferred to a secure 
computer drive, accessed only by the researcher. Your online questionnaire will be stored 
confidentially in a password-protected surveymonkey account and then downloaded and stored as 
per electronic data.  All data will be stored for a period of 10 years and then destroyed. Your GP 
may be informed if the researcher becomes concerned about your mental well-being (e.g. if it 
seemed you were suffering from severe depression).  Every attempt would be made to discuss this 
course of action with you before contacting your GP. 
 
 
What will happen to the results of this research study? 
 
The results will be submitted for examination as part of the requirement for the Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology at the University of Glasgow and it is hoped that the study will be published in a 
scientific journal.  Your identification will not be included in any publication. Participants will be 
provided with a summary of the research findings upon request from the researcher. 
 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
Institute of Health and Wellbeing, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of 
Glasgow 
 
 
Who has approved the study? 
 
The study has been reviewed and approved by the Institute of Health and Wellbeing, College of 
Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow and the University of Glasgow 
Research Ethics Committee.   
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Contact for further information 
 
If you wish to discuss any points covered in the information sheet or wish to ask any questions 
about the study, please do not hesitate to get in contact with Bernadette O’ Sullivan or my 
supervisor at the contact details below: 
 
Bernadette O’ Sullivan     Professor Kate Davidson  
Trainee Clinical Psychologist     Academic Supervisor    
  
Institute of Health and Wellbeing   Institute of Health and Wellbeing 
College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences College of Medical, Veterinary and Life 
Sciences 
University of Glasgow     University of Glasgow 
1st Floor, Administration Building    1st Floor, Administration Building 
Gartnavel Royal Hospital     Gartnavel Royal Hospital 
1055 Great Western Road    1055 Great Western Road 
Glasgow G12 0XH     Glasgow G12 0XH 
Telephone or text: 07706799375   Email:  kate.davidson@glasgow.ac.uk  
(available Mon-Fri, 9am-5pm) 
Email: glasgowthoughtstudy2@gmail.com   
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR READING THIS INFORMATION SHEET.  PLEASE KEEP A COPY FOR REFERENCE.  
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Appendix 2.4 Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
Project Title:  An Investigation into Ways of Managing Unwanted Intrusive Thoughts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Check the three statements given below and give your name and date below. 
Please save a copy of your completed consent form 
 
 
 
1. I can confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study 
and that I have had the opportunity to ask questions 
 
 
YES     NO 
 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any time, without 
giving any reason, without my legal rights being affected. 
 
YES     NO 
 
 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
YES     NO 
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant  ………………………………………………………………… (Print)  
   
 
                                ………………………………………………………………… (Sign)  
 
Date                       ……………………………… 
 
 
Name of Researcher    ………………………………………………………………… (Print) 
 
………………………………………………………………… (Sign)  
 
 
Date                       ……………………………… 
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Appendix 2.5: VAS Appraisals Questionnaire 
 
VISUAL ANALOGUE SCALES 
 
 
How unpleasant is this thought? 
 
 
 
 
 
How guilty does this thought make you feel when it comes into your head?  
 
 
 
 
 
When this thought comes into your head how much do you worry that you might act on it or 
that it might otherwise happen in real life?  
 
 
 
 
 
How difficult is it for you to eliminate this thought once it comes into your head?  
 
 
 
 
 
How unacceptable is this thought? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
not at all  extremely 
not at all  extremely 
not at all          a great deal 
not at all  extremely 
not at all  extremely 
81 
 
 
How important is it that you control, or suppress, this thought?  
 
 
 
 
 
To what extent does having this thought signify harm/danger to yourself or others? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When you have this thought, how responsible do you feel for harm occurring to yourself or to 
others?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
not at all  extremely 
   No 
harm/danger 
  
Extreme 
harm/danger 
not at all  wholly 
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Appendix 2.6: DAILY DIARY  
DAYS 1, 2, 5 & 6 
    
 
Date:_____________ 
 
 Tally counter score:  _____________ 
 Estimate the number of times that your chosen intrusive thought entered your mind during 
the day:        _____________ 
 
 
 
-  How much time did you spend thinking about your chosen intrusive thought during the day? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  How much distress did your chosen intrusive thought cause you during the day? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
-  How believable was your chosen intrusive thought during the day? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
no time at all all the time 
none at all a great deal 
 
 
not at all 
 
 
extremely 
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DAYS 3 & 4 
 
Date:_____________ 
 
 Tally counter score:  _____________ 
 Estimate the number of times that your chosen intrusive thought entered your mind during 
the day:        _____________ 
 
 
-  How much time did you spend thinking about your chosen intrusive thought during the day? 
 
 
 
 
 
-  How much distress did your chosen intrusive thought cause you during the day? 
  
 
 
 
 
-  How believable was your chosen intrusive thought during the day? 
 
 
 
 
-  How much did you try to follow the instructions relating to your chosen intrusive thought during 
the day? 
         not at all         a great deal 
 
 
 
-  How easy was it to follow the instructions relating to your chosen intrusive thought during the 
day? 
 
         not at all         extremely 
 
 
 
no time at all all the time 
none at all a great deal 
 
not at all 
 
extremely 
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Appendix 2.7: Description of an Intrusive Thought* 
 
We are interested in your experiences with unpleasant and unwanted thoughts or images or 
impulses that pop into your mind unexpectedly. Nearly everyone has such experiences, but 
people vary in how frequently these occur and how distressing they are.  Some examples of the 
many possible negative intrusions are given below: 
 
 an impulse to do something shameful or terrible 
 the idea or image of harming someone you don't want to hurt 
 the idea that something terrible will occur because you were not careful enough 
 an unwanted sexual urge or image 
 the thought that you or someone else will become dirty or contaminated by a substance  
that  
may cause harm 
 the thought that you left an appliance on that might cause a fire 
 an image of a loved one having an accident 
 the thought that objects are not arranged perfectly 
 a thought or image that is contrary to your religious or moral beliefs 
 an impulse to say something rude or embarrassing 
 the thought of running your car/bike off the road or into oncoming traffic 
 the thought that you didn‘t lock the door and someone may break in 
 
Please note that we are NOT talking about daydreams or pleasant fantasies. Nor are we interested 
in thoughts, impulses, or images that are simply excessive worries about real-life problems. Also, 
we are NOT talking about the sort of negative thoughts that accompany depression or low 
self-confidence.  Rather, we ARE interested in thoughts, mental images, or impulses that pop into 
your mind and that you experience as intrusive and inappropriate. 
 
* Based on instructions from the Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory (III; Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group, 2005) 
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Appendix 2.8: Target Thought Monitoring Instructions 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR DAYS 1 AND 2 
“For the next 2 days please follow these instructions. It doesn’t matter whether your chosen 
thought comes to mind often or not.  It might or it might not, it can do either. However, if your 
thought does come to mind, please record each time it happens on your tally counter. It is 
important that you continue with these instructions until you receive a further text message 
instruction”.   
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR DAYS 5 AND 6 
“For the next two days, please disregard your instructions for days 3 and 4 and just do exactly as 
you did on days 1 and 2. In other words, it does not matter whether your chosen thought comes 
to mind often or not.  It might or it might not. However, if your thought does come to mind, 
record each time it happens on your tally counter. Please get in touch if you have any questions”. 
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Appendix 2.9: Cognitive Defusion Experimental Instructions 
 
These are your INSTRUCTIONS FOR DAYS 3 AND 4. I will be asking you to try an exercise that may 
seem a bit unusual. The rationale for this exercise is explained below. Please read this sheet 
carefully. Read it a couple of times to make sure you understand what you are being asked to do 
and why. 
 
Rationale 
Our minds are constantly telling us stories. People have a tendency to believe the 
stories/thoughts their minds tell them without questioning them. Obviously, some thoughts are 
true; we call these facts. But many thoughts cannot really be called facts. They are more like 
opinions, judgments, or predictions that may not fit with how things actually are.  
For this exercise, I would like you to focus not on whether your target thought is true or false, but 
on whether it is helpful. If you let it guide your behaviour, will that help you to create a richer, 
fuller, and more meaningful life? If you get caught up with your target thought, will it help you to 
be the person you want to be and do the things you want to do? What if you could learn a skill so 
that next time you have your target thought, you don’t get all absorbed in it. 
I’d like you to try something now. Silently repeat to yourself “I can’t lift my arm”. Say it over and 
over again in your head and as you’re saying it, try to lift your arm up. You should find that you 
can lift your arm even though your mind says you can’t. You may have hesitated though. We’re so 
used to believing what our minds tell us, for a moment you may have actually believed it. 
However, you can now see that you have the ability to control your behaviour regardless of what 
your mind is doing. 
 
Instructions 
Over the next 2 days, every time your target thought pops into your head, record this on your 
tally counter, just as before. Then your task is to use the technique described below. 
Whenever you have your target thought, silently repeat the thought in your head with this 
phrase in front of it, “I notice I am having the thought that …”. For example, “I notice I am 
having the thought that I left the cooker switched on”.  
It is important that you do not record this repetition of your target thought on your tally counter. 
Only record instances when your target thought pops into your head unintentionally. 
The purpose of this exercise is to help create some distance between you and your target thought 
and stop you becoming caught up with the content of your thought. Please use this technique 
with your target thought from now until you receive further instructions.  
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Appendix 2.10: Suppression Experimental Instructions 
 
You will find below your INSTRUCTIONS FOR DAYS 3 AND 4. Please read this sheet carefully. Read 
it a couple of times to make sure you understand what you are being asked to do and why. 
 
 
 
Rationale 
 
It is often said that much of our distress is caused by our negative or worrying 
thoughts, such as negative thoughts about the past, self, and the future. According to 
this view, these thoughts can cause difficult feelings and some unhelpful behaviours.  
 
Do you see this pattern? First, there is the distressing thought and then problematic 
feelings and/or behaviour. One way to prevent this pattern is to control your 
distressing thoughts. You could control them by trying hard not to have these thoughts 
or by pushing them out of your mind as soon as they occur. This can help make those 
thoughts go away for a while and give you a break from them. 
 
For the next couple of minutes, please practise trying as hard as you can not to think of 
your target thought and if it comes to mind, try to get rid of it. 
 
 
 
Instructions 
 
For the next 2 days, I want you to try as hard as possible not to think of your target 
thought. Anytime the thought does pop into your head, record this using your tally 
counter and then try as hard as you can to push it out of your mind and make it 
disappear. However, if it pops into your head again at any point, please record this on 
your tally counter and try to get rid of it once again. Please continue to follow these 
instructions until you hear from me again.  
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Appendix 2.11: Research Proposal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment: Major Research Project Draft Proposal 
 
Title: Comparing the Effectiveness of Thought Suppression and a 
Cognitive Defusion Technique in managing Obsessional Intrusive 
Thoughts 
 
 
 
Clinical Psychology Trainee: Bernadette O‘ Sullivan (1005261O) 
 
University Supervisor: Professor Kate Davidson    Field Supervisor: Dr. Andrew McLean 
 
Date of Submission: 16/04/12 
 
Version: 2 
 
Word count: 3039 words 
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Abstract 
Background  
Thought suppression has been implicated in the development and maintenance of 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Based on Wegner et al.‘s (1987) research, 
suppression is widely viewed to lead to a paradoxical increase in thought frequency. 
However, further research evidence has been inconsistent and its interpretation has been 
hindered by methodological limitations of studies.  
Cognitive defusion offers a possible alternative method of managing intrusive thoughts. 
Although cognitive defusion strategies are frequently used within an Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT) based clinical context, the empirical evidence to support their 
efficacy is relatively limited. 
Aims 
To employ a naturalistic experimental design to compare the effects of suppression and a 
cognitive defusion technique on thought frequency and distress in a non-clinical, highly 
obsessional cohort.  
Methods 
A cohort of 60 ―obsessive‖ students from Glasgow University will be asked to monitor 
their intrusive thoughts for an initial two days. They will be asked to suppress these 
thoughts or employ a cognitive defusion technique for the following two days. On the final 
two days, they will be asked to return to just monitoring their thoughts. 
Applications 
The proposed study will have theoretical and research applications and could have clinical 
applications for both traditional cognitive-behavioural and ACT-based interventions for 
OCD. 
 
Introduction 
Unwanted intrusive thoughts emerge as symptoms across a range of disorders, from OCD 
to generalised anxiety disorder, and depression, etc. (Clark, 2005). The focus in this study 
will be on intrusive thoughts in OCD. Leading cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) 
models of OCD implicate suppression (i.e. trying not to think about something) as key in 
the development and maintenance of this disorder. For example, Salkovskis argues that 
thoughts give rise to active resistance when they activate overvalued beliefs that thoughts 
can cause harm, and that the individual is bound to prevent harm, even if his/her 
responsibility for harm is minute and uncertain (Salkovskis, 1985; 1989; 1998, Salkovskis 
et al., 1995; 2000). Thus, individuals must control thoughts that signify potential harm in 
order to prevent harm and the aversive sense that they may otherwise become responsible 
for harm. Furthermore, Rachman proposes that active resistance arises from beliefs that a 
thought about an action that is immoral is equivalent morally to actually performing that 
action (moral thought-action fusion) and that having thoughts about an event increases the 
likelihood of that event happening (likelihood thought-action fusion) (Rachman, 1997; 
1998, Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). The individual attempts to control the thought because 
it offends her/his moral sensibilities both by its occurrence and because it may increase the 
likelihood of morally objectionable events occurring. 
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However, suppression is commonly believed to lead to a paradoxical increase in thought 
frequency since Wegner et al.‘s (1987) classic ―white bear‖ studies. In these studies, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups, each completing two five 
minute conditions in counterbalanced order: 1) trying not to think of a white bear 
(suppression); 2) trying to think of a white bear (expression). It was found that during 
suppression, participants were unable to suppress white bear thoughts fully. Furthermore, 
thought occurrences were more frequent in the expression period following initial 
suppression than in the initial expression period. Therefore, it was suggested that 
suppression produced what has been called the ―rebound effect‖. Further research 
demonstrated an increase in thought frequency during the act of suppression (e.g. Lavy & 
van den Hout, 1990), known as the ―immediate enhancement effect‖.  
 
Research evidence in this area has, however, been inconsistent. The authors of a systematic 
review of the effects of thought suppression on OCD (McLean & Broomfield, 
unpublished) concluded that there was no firm experimental evidence that suppression of 
OCD-type intrusions led to a rebound effect and limited support for an immediate 
enhancement effect. Furthermore, the interpretation of findings in this area has been 
hampered by methodological limitations of some of the studies to date. Key limitations 
identified in reviews by Purdon (2004), McLean & Broomfield (unpublished), and 
Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street (2001) include a lack of studies in clinical populations, 
studies that have used emotionally neutral thoughts, a reliance on lab-based experimental 
sessions, and lack of appropriate control conditions. 
 
Cognitive defusion offers a possible alternative method of managing intrusive thoughts. It 
is a core element of ACT. In ACT, clients are encouraged to make willing contact with 
aversive psychological content. Cognitive defusion techniques are often employed in ACT 
interventions to achieve this. ACT explicitly states that the modification of problematic 
private events in function, and not in form or frequency, is the aim of treatment (Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). From an ACT perspective, clients are frequently fused with 
painful or negatively evaluated psychological content and defusion strategies create a 
defused perspective that allows greater behavioural flexibility.  
Titchener‘s (1916) rapid word-repetition technique is perhaps the most well-known method 
for facilitating defusion. Within ACT, clients might be encouraged to repeat negative 
words rapidly (e.g. ―stupid, stupid, stupid‖). The therapeutic aim of this strategy is that, 
during the repetition task, the semantic functions (i.e. meaning) of the word will be 
significantly reduced. Clients have reported that towards the end of the exercise they 
experienced the words simply as a strange sound (Hayes, et al., 1999). The therapist then 
uses this experience to highlight that the client‘s negative thought content is purely verbal 
and not a reflection of reality.  
Although cognitive defusion strategies are frequently used within an ACT-based clinical 
context, the empirical evidence to support their efficacy is relatively limited (Healy et al., 
2008). A study with a non-clinical sample showed the relative effectiveness of an 
acceptance-based technique as compared to suppression in reducing distress but not 
frequency of intrusive thoughts (Marcks and Woods, 2005). The acceptance-based 
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technique consisted of asking participants to imagine their unwanted intrusive thoughts 
coming out their ears on little signs held by marching soldiers. They were then asked to 
just watch the soldiers march by in front of them like a little parade and not to argue with, 
avoid, or make the signs go away. Najmi et al. (2009) confirmed these findings in a clinical 
sample of OCD clients using the same acceptance technique. They showed that distress 
after suppression increased significantly, whereas distress after acceptance decreased 
significantly. Watson, Burley, and Purdon (2010) examined the effects of the cognitive 
defusion strategy of verbal repetition on reappraisal of contamination-related thoughts, 
typical of those experienced by individuals with OCD. They compared verbal repetition to 
brief imaginal exposure and no intervention (control). In the verbal repetition condition, 
participants were asked to engage in 30 seconds of repeating contamination words (e.g. 
disease, germs) loudly and as fast as possible. Those in the imaginal exposure condition 
were asked to imagine scenes involving contamination words for 30 seconds. Participants 
in the control condition were requested to sit quietly. Following the intervention, 
participants in the verbal repetition and imaginal exposure groups were asked to practice 
their intervention over the next week. Results showed that verbal repetition was associated 
with a greater decrease in negative appraisal ratings (believability, meaningfulness, 
distress) at post-intervention and at follow-up (1 week later) than was imaginal exposure or 
no intervention. One limitation of these ACT-based studies is that they were lab-based 
experiments (apart from the follow-up period in Watson, Burley, and Purdon (2010) and 
therefore lacking in ecological validity.   
 
Rationale 
The current study will compare the effectiveness of suppression and a cognitive defusion 
technique in the naturalistic setting of participants‘ day-to-day environment over a period 
of six days. It should improve on methodological limitations in the current literature by use 
of a longer experimental period, conducted in the participant‘s natural environment, an 
analogue sample of participants who rate highly on a measure of obsessionality, personally 
relevant intrusive thoughts, and a baseline monitoring period. 
 
Aims and hypotheses 
Aims 
To employ a naturalistic experimental design to compare the effects of thought suppression 
and a cognitive defusion technique on thought frequency and distress in a non-clinical, 
highly obsessional cohort.  
Hypotheses 
The instruction to suppress intrusive thoughts will: 
  increase intrusive thought frequency during suppression and in the subsequent 
monitoring phase relative to baseline. That is, immediate enhancement and 
rebound effects are predicted.  
 Increase distress during suppression and in the subsequent monitoring phase 
relative to baseline. 
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The instruction to defuse from intrusive thoughts will:  
 not result in any change in intrusive thought frequency. 
 decrease distress during the defusion phase relative to baseline. 
 
Plan of Investigation 
Participants 
Students at Glasgow University will be sent an email invitation asking if they experience 
intrusive thoughts and whether they would like to participate in a study about such 
thoughts. They will be provided with a link to an electronic screening instrument 
(Obsessions Subscale of the Clark-Beck Obsessive Compulsive Inventory) and a 
participant information sheet. Only individuals scoring ≥ 12 on the obsessions subscale (= 
1 SD below the clinical mean) will be included in the study. It was decided to recruit 
students to this study because of their accessibility to the researcher. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that non-clinical individuals with high scores on self-report measures of OCD 
symptoms are a suitable group for studying OCD (Burns et al., 1995). Individuals 
receiving psychiatric or psychological treatment or scoring within the severe range on the 
HADS will be excluded from the study.  
 
Measures 
Obsessions Subscale of the Clark Beck Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (Clark & Beck, 
2002) 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) 
Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells & Davies, 1994) 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II, Bond et al., 2011) 
Frequency of intrusive thoughts will be measured by a hand-held golf tally counter, which 
has been applied in similar studies (e.g. McLean & Broomfield, 2007; Marks & Woods, 
2005). 
Levels of distress and appraisals of intrusions (e.g. unacceptability, believability of the 
thought) will be measured using Visual Analogue Scales (VAS). Appraisal items will be 
based on questions from Part II of the Revised Obsessional Intrusions Inventory (ROII, 
Purdon & Clark, 1994). 
A Daily Diary will be provided to participants to record thought frequency and VAS 
ratings of distress associated with intrusive thoughts, acceptability and believability of 
intrusions, and effort and perceived success of suppression and cognitive defusion. 
 
Design  
The study will have an experimental 2 (group) x 3 (phase) mixed model design. 
Participants will be randomly assigned using a computerised random number generation 
procedure to a suppression or defusion condition. Participants will be asked to monitor 
their intrusive thoughts for an initial two days (baseline monitoring phase). They will be 
asked to suppress these thoughts or employ a defusion technique for the following two 
days. On the final two days, they will be asked to return to just monitoring their thoughts. 
The baseline monitoring periods will allow participants act as their own controls. The 
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dependent variables will be intrusion frequency, associated distress, and appraisals of 
intrusions. The primary dependent variable will be thought frequency.  
 
Research Procedures 
The study will be conducted over a one week period and the researcher will meet with 
participants on a one-to-one basis at the start and end of this period. At the pre-
experimental meeting, participants will provide demographic data and complete baseline 
measurements for the HADS and AAQ-II. A personally relevant intrusive thought 
experienced within the past week will be identified and participants will be asked to 
complete a VAS questionnaire assessing their appraisals and distress associated with this 
thought.  
See Appendices II and III for a description of how instructions will be provided to 
participants for thought monitoring, suppression, and cognitive defusion over the following 
six days. 
At the post-experimental meeting, participants will be asked to complete the same VAS 
questionnaire as at the pre-experimental meeting. Compliance with experimental 
instructions will be measured qualitatively by asking participants how they suppressed or 
cognitively defused from their thoughts. A random subsample of these descriptions will be 
analysed by two different investigators and rated for compliance with instructions. Finally, 
participants will be asked to complete the Thought Control Questionnaire as it related to 
strategies employed on days three and four of the experiment.  
 
Data Analysis 
Raw data will be anonymised and analysed using PASW Statistics 18. Data will be tested 
for normality and homogeneity of variance. Where appropriate, transformations will be 
employed. Independent t-tests for continuous data and Chi-squared tests for categorical 
data will be used to examine differences between groups. Mann-Whitney U tests will be 
used for non-parametric data. Correlational analyses will be used to investigate 
associations between variables. To examine the main hypotheses, each dependent variable 
will be analysed using a mixed 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA.  
 
Justification of sample size 
Power calculations using G-POWER (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) were completed 
to determine the required sample size based on the primary hypothesis. This hypothesis 
predicts a significant effect of experimental group (suppression, defusion) on thought 
frequency over six time points using a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Methodology employed in previous research was not sufficiently comparable to estimate 
effect sizes for the current study. Therefore, Cohen‘s effect size (f) conventions for 
ANOVA (Cohen, 1977, 1988) were used with values of 0.1, 0.25, and 0.4 corresponding to 
small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. The following assumptions were made, 
rho was conservatively predicted to be 0.3, correlations between all possible pairs of 
repeated measures would be identical (as assumed with repeated measures ANOVA) and 
significance level was taken as 0.05. Results indicated that for ―medium‖ effect sizes, a 
total sample size of 40 would have adequate power (>0.80). Therefore, the researcher will 
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aim to have 30 participants in each group to allow for participants dropping out of the 
study early or not completing measures.  
 
Ethical Issues  
Ethical approval will be sought from the University of Glasgow Ethics Committee. The 
standard boundaries for confidentiality will apply and therefore should risk arise (e.g. 
participant discloses suicidal ideation or thoughts of self-harm) during the study, 
participants‘ GP will be informed. Any contact with GPs will be discussed with the 
participant beforehand whenever possible and the participant information sheet will outline 
this procedure for potential participants.  
 
See Appendices IV and V for a description of health and safety issues and research 
equipment and expenses. 
 
Timetable 
Outline – 12th December 2011 
Draft Proposal – 31st January 2012 
MRP Final Proposal – 16th April 2012 
Ethics application to be submitted – July 2012 
Ethics approval to be obtained by September 2012 
Recruitment/Data collection to commence – September/October 2012 
Draft thesis – June 2013 
Submission – July 2013 
 
 
Practical Applications  
It is hoped that knowledge provided by the current study may lead to clinical implications 
relevant to both traditional CBT and ACT-based interventions for OCD. 
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Appendix I:  
Lay Summary 
 
Study Aims 
The aims of this study are to find out what happens when people are told to ―suppress‖ or 
―defuse‖ from their thoughts. Suppressing thoughts means asking people not to think about 
something. Defusion involves allowing people to step back from and watch their thoughts 
come and go instead of getting caught up in them. This study is interested in a particular 
type of thought experienced in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) called an obsession. 
This is an unpleasant and unwanted intrusive thought that pops into your mind 
unexpectedly.  
 
What the Study Involves 
Students of the University of Glasgow, who are experiencing intrusive thoughts, will be 
asked to participate. They will be randomly split into two groups: (1) suppression and (2) 
defusion. Participants will be asked to record the frequency of their intrusive thoughts over 
one week. They will also provide ratings about their distress levels and views associated 
with these intrusive thoughts. On days three and four, participants in the suppression group 
will be asked to try as hard as possible not to think about their intrusive thought. Those in 
the defusion group will be taught a simple strategy to help prevent them getting caught up 
with their intrusive thought. 
 
Practical Implications 
It is hoped that the results may lead to improvements in treatments offered to those with 
OCD.   
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Appendix II: Experimental Instructions 
 
Thought Monitoring Instructions 
At the pre-experimental meeting, participants will be given instructions to record their 
chosen thought over the following six days by clicking a golf tally, which they will be 
asked to keep with them at all times. They will be given a diary to record daily intrusive 
thought frequency and appraisals. They will also be provided with two envelopes with 
further instructions to open on days three and five and given a text reminder on these days 
to open the appropriate envelope.  
 
Suppression and Cognitive Defusion Groups 
Over days three and four, those in the suppression group will be instructed to try as hard as 
they can not to allow their chosen thought into their mind. However, if the thought does 
come to mind, they should record this on their tally counter. The instructions will include a 
rationale for using thought suppression. Those in the cognitive defusion group will be 
asked to employ a simple cognitive defusion strategy (outlined in the instructions) to help 
them detach from their chosen thought, should it occur. Similar to the suppression group, 
they will be requested to record these thought occurrences. Again, the instructions will 
include a rationale for cognitive defusion adapted from the ACT manual (Hayes et al., 
1999).  
 
On days five and six, all participants will be instructed to return to simply monitoring their 
chosen thought in the same way as on days one and two.  
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Appendix III: Flowchart of Study Schedule 
 
Random Assignment to Groups at pre-experimental meeting 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-experimental meeting  
 
 
 
Suppression Group Cognitive Defusion 
Group 
Baseline Monitoring 
Period (Days 1 + 2) 
Baseline Monitoring 
Period (Days 1 + 2) 
Suppression Period 
(Days 3 + 4) 
Cognitive Defusion 
Period (Days 3 + 4) 
Monitoring Period 
(Days 5 + 6) 
Monitoring Period  
(Days 5 + 6) 
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Appendix IV: 
WEST OF SCOTLAND/ UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
DOCTORATE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
HEALTH AND SAFETY FOR RESEARCHERS 
 
 
1. Title of Project Comparing the Effectiveness of Thought Suppression 
and a Cognitive Defusion Technique in managing 
Obsessional Intrusive Thoughts. 
2. Trainee Bernadette O’ Sullivan 
3. University Supervisor Professor Kate Davidson 
4. Other Supervisor(s) Dr. Andrew McLean 
5. Local Lead Clinician  
6. Participants:  (age,  group or sub-
group, pre- or post-treatment, etc) 
Students of the University of Glasgow 
7. Procedures to be applied  
(eg, questionnaire, interview, etc) 
 
 
Participants will be required to record the occurrence 
of an intrusive thought and complete questionnaires 
and visual analogue scales to measure their distress 
levels and appraisals of these thoughts.   
8. Setting (where will procedures be 
carried out?) 
i) General 
The study will be conducted over the period of a week 
within participants’ own natural environments. In 
other words, participants will be asked to follow study 
instructions as they go about their day-to-day lives 
over this period. They will also be invited to attend 
two one-to-one meetings with the researcher on the 
University campus at the beginning and end of the 
research period. The researcher will not meet with 
participants during the study period other than on 
these two occasions. 
 ii) Are home visits involved  Y/N 
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WEST OF SCOTLAND/ UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
DOCTORATE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
HEALTH AND SAFETY FOR RESEARCHERS 
 
 
9. Potential Risk Factors Identified  
      (see chart) 
 
 
 
 
Participants will be asked to monitor their intrusive 
thoughts. It is expected that this may cause some 
discomfort for a short time. This possibility will be 
explained to participants in the information sheet 
provided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 10. Actions to minimise risk (refer to 
9) 
 
 
Individuals receiving current psychiatric or 
psychological treatment will be excluded from 
participating in the study. Those scoring within the 
severe range on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale will also be excluded.  
The standard boundaries for confidentiality will apply 
and therefore should risk issues (e.g. disclosure of 
suicidal ideation) arise during the study, participants’ 
GPs will be informed. Any contact with GPs will be 
discussed with participants beforehand whenever 
possible. This will be explained to potential 
participants in the participant information sheet.  
Meetings with participants will be held on the 
University campus (within the Public Health 
Department, 1 Lilybank Gardens, University of 
Glasgow) within staffed areas, and will occur during 
standard working hours (i.e. 9am to 5pm).  
This study methodology has been used previously by a 
Clinical Psychology Trainee, with no serious adverse 
effects reported (Ralston, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
Trainee signature:  .......................................................................... Date:  ............................................... 
 
University supervisor signature: ..................................................................  Date: ......................................  
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WEST OF SCOTLAND/ UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
DOCTORATE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
HEALTH AND SAFETY FOR RESEARCHERS 
 
 
Points to consider when assessing risk.  If any answer is “no” then make a case for the design being 
safe or reconsider the design of the study. 
 
 
Participants 
Yes No 
This participant sample is not normally 
associated with dangerous or unpredictable 
behaviour 
This participant sample is associated with 
impulsive, irrational or unpredictable 
behaviour, and/or has poor emotional control 
 
Procedures 
Yes No 
The procedures in the study are same/similar to 
those used by clinical psychologists with these 
participants and are not normally associated 
with production of significant distress. 
These are novel procedures, are not used with 
this group and by their nature might produce 
anger, irritability or distress. 
 
Settings 
Yes No 
These are clinical or University research 
settings, or other institutional settings, that 
participants routinely attend (eg, a school).  
They have procedures in place to minimise risk 
to staff and these are thought to be adequate in 
the context of the proposed study. 
A private or other setting where there are not 
health and safety procedures that are relevant to 
research or clinical work  proceeding without 
risk 
 
 
 
 
 
Version 3/10/06 
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Appendix V: 
 
 
RESEARCH EQUIPMENT, CONSUMABLES AND EXPENSES  
 
 
Trainee …Bernadette O’ Sullivan……………………………………………………………………       
 
Year of Course …2nd……………  Intake Year…2010…………… 
 
Please complete the list below to the best of your ability: 
 
 
Item 
 
Details and Amount 
Required 
 
Cost or Specify if to 
Request to Borrow from 
Department 
 
Stationary 
 
 
180 A5 envelopes 
 
£2.60 
 
Postage 
 
  
 
Photocopying and Laser 
Printing  (includes cost of 
white paper) 
 
 
 
Daily diaries  x 420 
VAS scales (2 pages) pre- 
and post-experiment 
Consent forms x 120 
Experimental instructions 
x360 
Photocopying  60 HADS 
and  
60 Thought Control 
Questionnaires (2 pages) 
and 60AAQ-II 
 
£33.60 
 
£19.20 
£9.60 
 
£28.80 
 
£4.80 
 
£9.60 
£4.80 
 
Equipment and Software 
 
 
 
Mobile phone SIM card 
Phone usage  
 
£10 
£30 
 
Measures 
 
 
 
Clark-Beck Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory 
(CBOCI). 3 packs of 25 
record forms.  
 
 
 
 
£139.50 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
 
Survey Monkey costs 
£24 per month x 7 
 
£168 
 
 
Trainee Signature……………………………………   Date……………………… 
 
Supervisor’s Signature ………………………………..    Date ……………………… 
 
